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THE SECOND-CLASS CLASS ACTION:  HOW 
COURTS THWART WAGE RIGHTS BY 
MISAPPLYING CLASS ACTION RULES 
SCOTT A. MOSS & NANTIYA RUAN* 
Courts apply to wage rights cases an aggressive scrutiny that not only 
disadvantages low-wage workers, but is fundamentally incorrect on the law.  Rule 23 
class actions automatically cover all potential members if the court grants plaintiffs’ 
class certification motion. But for certain employment rights cases—mainly wage 
claims but also age discrimination and gender equal pay claims—29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
allows not class actions but “collective actions” covering just those opting in 
affirmatively.  Yet courts in collective actions assume a gatekeeper role just as they do 
in Rule 23 class actions, disallowing many actions by requiring a certification motion 
proving strict commonality among members. 
This Article argues that conditioning § 216(b) collective actions on certification 
motions proving commonality is incorrect.  Section 216(b) is not an opt-in version of 
Rule 23; it is a liberalized form of simple Rule 20 joinder, which permits joint suit 
whenever claims share one common issue and address related events. No text 
authorizes any § 216(b) certification inquiry, nor is judicial gatekeeping justified by 
economic logic: Rule 23 classes present principal-agent and asymmetric information 
problems because lead plaintiffs may inadequately represent unengaged members, but 
all § 216(b) collective actions members are full plaintiffs with individual claims, 
obviating the need for judicial scrutiny. 
Wage rights cases commonly are high-impact challenges to entire industry pay 
practices, seeking millions in unpaid wages for thousands of workers. Especially for 
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low-wage workers, disallowing collective actions ends the claims; individual suits are 
cost-prohibitive. Even when collective actions proceed, certification motions yield cost 
and delay, thwarting claims and deterring attorneys. 
Courts should presumptively allow collective actions whenever workers for the same 
employer press the same statutory claims. Defendants should bear the burden of 
challenging collective actions in a Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motion.  
This Article provides two explanations for such pervasive judicial error. In a complex, 
once-obscure field, courts heavily relied upon early precedent that proved incorrect, 
yielding path-dependent “lock-in” of bad law. Less charitably, courts’ mishandling of 
collective actions is just another example of federal courts erecting procedural hurdles 
to rights-vindicating litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 heightened the degree of 
“commonality”2 required in a class action and thereby rejected a 
nationwide sex discrimination class action.3  Because of a decades-old 
misapplication of class action law, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores may undercut not only class actions, but also the 
procedurally distinct “collective actions” that let masses of workers 
sue for unpaid wages. 
Plaintiffs with similar claims need not bring a class action, of 
course; joinder rules let them just file one joint complaint.4  But 
joinder becomes infeasible with too many plaintiffs, so a few named 
plaintiffs can file a class action for a large group.  Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 compels class action plaintiffs to file a motion for 
“class certification,” applying the seven-part test of Rule 23(a)–(b);5 a 
certified class automatically includes all within the class definition, 
with no need for each individual to join affirmatively.6 
Rule 23, however, is trumped by the special procedure established 
in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for certain employment claims7—mainly for 
unpaid minimum or overtime wages, but also for age discrimination 
and gender wage discrimination.8  For those claims, § 216(b) 
authorizes not automatic-inclusion class actions, but opt-in collective 
actions:  “No employee shall be a party” without filing a “consent in 
writing” and being “similarly situated” to the others.9 
While the § 216(b) “similarly situated” language would seem to 
demand less than the substantial commonality of Rule 23, courts 
subject § 216(b) collective actions to rules largely paralleling Rule 
23.10  Courts require plaintiffs to move for collective action 
                                                          
 1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring “questions of law or fact common to the 
class”). 
 3. See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (finding plaintiffs lacked “commonality” 
because “claims must depend upon a common contention,” like violations by “the 
same supervisor,” or another issue “capable of classwide resolution—which means 
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (requiring that plaintiffs must satisfy the four 
elements of Rule 23(a)(1)–(4), plus any one of the three requirements of Rule 
23(b)(1)–(3)). 
 6. Id. 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 8. See Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour 
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2009) (explaining that wage claims are the 
most common claim type, comprising nearly one in five of all federal class or 
collective actions). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 10. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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“certification” paralleling the Rule 23 class certification motion.11  On 
that motion, courts impose on plaintiffs a burden of proof of a 
“stricter” degree of commonality than Rule 20 joinder, under which 
plaintiffs must show there are not “disparate factual and employment 
settings” or individualized defenses.12  Courts thus disallow collective 
actions even by workers claiming the same employer violated the 
same wage rule; for example, if workers had different supervisors, 
worksites, or pay schemes.13 
This Article argues that courts handle § 216(b) cases 
fundamentally incorrectly.  After Part I details how courts apply Rule 
23 and § 216(b), Part II.A then describes the many problems with the 
§ 216(b) jurisprudence.  Part II.A first argues that no collective action 
“certification motion” is authorized by rule, by statute, by historical 
practice, or by the logic under which such motions exist in class 
actions.  Because § 216(b) lacks the motion requirement of Rule 23, 
collective actions should be filed freely, just as the original version of 
Rule 23 featured no certification motion for “spurious” opt-in class 
actions closely paralleling § 216(b) cases.14  Moreover, whereas Rule 
23 covers all class members automatically, § 216(b) collective actions 
adjudicate the claims of only those opting in.  As a result, § 216(b) 
collective actions lack the key “principal-agent” problem15 justifying 
courts’ role as gatekeepers scrutinizing Rule 23 classes:  that class 
actions adjudicate the claims of even those unaware of the case, an 
“asymmetric information” problem16 that leaves absent class members 
at the mercy of class counsel.17 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 13. See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938). 
 15. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 609 (5th ed. 
2001) (defining a principal-agent problem as “agents pursu[ing] their own goals 
even when doing so entails lower profits for . . . principals”). 
 16. Id. at 596. 
 17. See, e.g., John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”:  Public Servants or Private 
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451 (2005) (asserting that the role of class 
counsel in “hold[ing] renegade corporations accountable” trumps recovery for class 
members (internal quotation marks omitted)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation 
Governance:  Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291–92 (2010) 
(discussing checks on the system of “entrepreneurial litigation” by lawyers that create 
“principal-agent” problems); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1991) (asserting that the 
“existing regulatory system” to protect “absent class members” is “poorly designed”).  
But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2006) (“[T]he 
so-called ‘agency cost’ problem is mostly a mirage.”). 
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Part II.A next argues that on § 216(b) certification motions, courts 
wrongly demand strict Rule 23 commonality, not the more liberal 
Rule 20 joinder requirement of one common issue.  Enacted in 1938 
and amended in 1947,18 § 216(b) was not a tightened opt-in version of 
Rule 23; it was a liberalized version of simple Rule 20 joinder, which 
allowed joint suits by plaintiffs with just one common issue.  By 
allowing “similarly situated” plaintiffs to join, § 216(b) aimed to 
facilitate, not restrict, joinder of presumptively similar coworker wage 
claims. 
Part II.B then explains how courts’ improperly high § 216(b) 
threshold imposes troubling consequences, starting with the rejection 
of meritorious collective actions.  Where wage violations go without 
remedy, the law goes without vindication; the cost is substantial, 
especially for low-income workers.  Even when courts allow collective 
actions, the complex certification motion and the necessary 
preliminary discovery generate delay and cost.  The delay eliminates 
the claims of workers whose statutes of limitations keep running until 
they can opt in; the cost means fewer claims are prosecuted, with 
large cases litigated by only a few major class action firms instead of a 
broad range of smaller or nonprofit firms.  Courts’ misstep in 
applying Rule 23 to § 216(b) cases is all the more troubling because 
the heightened Rule 23 “commonality” requirement in Wal-Mart 
Stores has the potential to largely limit employment class actions to 
addressing uniformly imposed unlawful policies. 
Part III offers a prescription for how courts should handle § 216(b) 
collective actions without any “certification motion” or strict 
commonality standard.  Properly interpreted, § 216(b) should let 
claims proceed as collective actions presumptively on a simple prima 
facie showing that workers press (a) the same statutory claim (e.g., a 
minimum wage violation, not wage claims mixed with discrimination 
claims) by (b) the same employer.  With no “certification motion,” 
proper defendants should bear the burden of challenging collective 
actions in either Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motions, 
paralleling practice in closely analogous “spurious” opt-in class 
actions under old Rule 23. 
With the opt-in rule lessening the asymmetric information and 
principal-agent problem of unaware class members, courts should not 
wield intrusive Rule 23-style powers over plaintiffs’ litigation choices.  
Rather, courts simply should grant or deny defense misjoinder or 
dismissal motions and supervise any court-ordered notification to 
                                                          
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 80-71 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030–32. 
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potential plaintiffs that is requested.  Still, collective actions are 
complex, and the same counsel represents plaintiffs of varied 
engagement levels; so some asymmetric information and principal-
agent problems remain, though not much more than in most non-
class litigation.  To police any remaining asymmetric information and 
principal-agent problems in § 216(b) cases, courts should carefully 
apply ethics rules requiring attorneys to keep clients informed, 
respect client decision-making autonomy, avoid client conflicts of 
interest, and competently represent clients. 
Part IV concludes by discussing how the § 216(b) case law ended 
up so wrong.  Part of the answer is that collective actions are much 
less known and studied than class actions; the few publications on § 
216(b) collective actions are mainly litigators’ practice pieces19 or 
student notes.20  Although the statute is old, the lack of attention is 
attributable to the fact that § 216(b) actions were obscure until a 
1990s proliferation of high-impact cases.21  Now, one in five aggregate 
(class or collective) lawsuits is a wage case,22 typically a multi-million 
dollar action by hundreds or thousands of employees claiming years 
of unpaid minimum23 or overtime wages,24 that challenges entire 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective 
Actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129, 130 (2003) 
(describing “the development of the collective action as a means of private Fair 
Labor Standards Act enforcement and the issues that have arisen in implementing 
these procedures”); Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction:  The “Class 
Certification” Decision in FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 267 (2009) (asserting 
that procedural rules for collective actions under the FLSA “needlessly discard the 
carefully balanced trade-offs between efficiency and due process struck by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
 20. See, e.g., James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and 
ADEA:  What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 98 
(2004) (emphasizing that differences between § 216(b) and Rule 23 “resulted largely 
by mistake”); Brian R. Gates, Note, A “Less Stringent” Standard?  How to Give FLSA § 
16(b) a Life of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2005) (arguing that 
instead of being analyzed merely as “‘less stringent’” than the Federal Rules, § 216 
should “claim its own place in the federal court system”); Daniel C. Lopez, Note, 
Collective Confusion:  FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling 
Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 278–79 (2009) (concluding that § 216 is an “antiquated 
vestige” that should be repealed). 
 21. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 22. Dorris, supra note 8, at 1251. 
 23. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 518 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing plaintiffs as eight hundred former employees of 
defendant “seeking payment of unpaid wages”); Zivali v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (providing that plaintiffs alleged their employer 
“failed to pay wages . . . in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act”). 
 24. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1239–40 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (explaining that plaintiffs “used Family Dollar’s payroll records to 
establish that 1,424 store managers routinely worked 60 to 70 hours a week and to 
quantify the overtime wages owed to each [of them]”); Archuleta v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining whether full-time 
pharmacists fell within the overtime exemption under FLSA for “‘executive, 
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industry pay practices.25  Furthermore, as § 216(b) is a complex, once-
obscure field of law, a small body of precedent, particularly one 
misconstrued decision, initially got it wrong; the American legal 
system’s respect for precedent resulted in “path dependence” that 
“locked in” this erroneous case.  A second, less charitable explanation 
for this erroneous case law is the federal courts’ hostility to individual 
rights litigation.  Especially as to procedural matters, courts display an 
agenda of limiting rights litigation, with rulings expanding dispositive 
motions, compelling arbitration, pre-empting state court litigation—
and, as this Article discusses—erecting misguided barriers to major 
aggregate litigation. 
I. HOW § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS DIFFER FROM RULE 23 CLASS 
ACTIONS 
A. Rule 23 Class Actions:  Close Scrutiny to Guard Against Agency 
Problems in Automatic-Inclusion Classes 
Class actions under Rule 23 cover varied subject matter, from 
common-law consumer fraud and mass torts claims to federal 
statutory antitrust and civil rights claims.26  Rule 23(a) imposes four 
conditions for a class action:   
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the 
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
                                                          
administrative or professional’ employees”). 
 25. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(per curiam) (affirming a district court holding that plaintiffs “were employed in an 
administrative capacity and thus exempt from 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)’s requirement of 
overtime compensation for employment in excess of forty hours”); Lee v. ABC 
Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 196–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing employer’s 
practice of characterizing carpet installation mechanics as “independent contractors” 
and the mechanics’ contention that they be considered “employee[s]” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 
2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (addressing whether plaintiffs were “independent 
contractors or employees entitled to be paid a minimum wage and time-and-a-half 
for overtime”). 
 26. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions after the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2006) (“[Rule 23(b)(2)] lead to the civil rights and 
institutional reform class actions of the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in significant 
changes in . . . governmental institutions and private businesses.  [Rule 23(b)(3)] 
lead initially to class actions based on . . . antitrust, securities fraud, and employment 
discrimination, but, by the 1980s and 1990s, migrated to a broad spectrum of 
commercial, consumer protection, environmental, product liability, and mass tort 
cases.”). 
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representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.27 
A class also must qualify as one of the three types in Rule 23(b), 
defined mainly by the relief sought.28  The least common, contained 
in Rule 23(b)(1), applies when separate actions risk multiple court 
orders inconsistent with each other or the rights of non-parties.29  
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when members seek mainly injunctive or 
declaratory relief against a party who acted “on grounds that apply 
generally to the class,”30 as in lawsuits against segregation or pollution.  
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) applies to money damages claims,31 making it 
most similar to § 216(b) wage collective actions.  A Rule 23(b)(3) 
class requires that common issues “predominate” over individual 
ones and that a class action be “superior to other” options, such as 
many individual suits.32 
Courts on class certification motions serve as gatekeepers, 
undertaking a “rigorous analysis” of whether evidence establishes 
each Rule 23 element.33  The Court in Wal-Mart Stores stressed this in 
holding that a class of 1.5 million plaintiffs failed to prove sufficiently 
“common questions” and in suggesting that the tougher 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), rather than 23(b)(2), are more 
proper for a class seeking substantial damages, not just injunctive 
relief.34  Certification receives close scrutiny because a Rule 23 class 
automatically includes and litigates all members’ claims with finality.  
Members must affirmatively opt out to be excluded, and they are 
guaranteed opt-out rights only in Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes.35  
Whether or not opting out is possible, class actions are criticized for 
causing “agency problems” in that most members participate 
                                                          
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
614 (1997) (applying Rule 23(b)(1) where the party “is obliged by law to treat the 
members of the class alike (a utility acting toward customers; a government imposing 
a tax).or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 31. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 33. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); see Amchem Prods., 
521 U.S. at 613–14 (citing the four threshold requirements applicable to all class 
actions). 
 34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011). 
 35. See, e.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(collecting circuit court decisions in limited fund and employment discrimination 
class actions in which the courts held that (b)(1) or (b)(2) members do not enjoy 
mandatory notice or opt-out rights under Rule 23, but “it is within judicial discretion 
to . . . [grant] such rights”). 
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minimally, if at all, in the case, allowing counsel and the few named 
plaintiffs to neglect or “sell out” the interests of the class.36 
B. Collective Actions:  Opt-In Required by Statute, Certification Motion 
Required by Judicial Practice, and Certification Frequently Denied 
For minimum or overtime wage claims under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA),37 age discrimination claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),38 and gender wage 
discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act (EPA),39 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) trumps Rule 23,40 authorizing collective actions41 very different 
from Rule 23 classes. 
                                                          
 36. See infra Part II.A.4.b (describing how the few decisionmakers can neglect or 
“sell out” the interests of the class). 
 37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).  Collective actions are typically FLSA claims, 
but for ADEA cases, see, for example, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 
167 (1989) (addressing whether “a district court conducting [an ADEA suit] may 
authorize and facilitate notice of the pending action”); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital 
Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that “[c]lass actions under 
the ADEA are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which expressly borrows the opt-in 
class action mechanism of the [FLSA]”); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1090 
(11th Cir. 1996) (deciding on interlocutory appeal the district judge’s order creating 
an opt-in class for store managers who “allege[d] that their demotions or 
terminations were motivated by age-discrimination in violation of the [ADEA]”); 
Krueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying plaintiffs’ 
motion to “bifurcate liability and damage issues” in ADEA class action). 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).  EPA claims are the least common collective action type, 
but for examples, see Collins v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1330–
31 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (granting defendant’s motion to decertify in case brought by 
female store managers claiming they were paid less than their male counterparts); 
Jarvaise v. Rand Corp., 212 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002) (granting certification for 
limited class of three women alleging EPA violations). 
 40. Arguments that Rule 23 trumps § 216(b), a federal statute, have consistently 
failed.  See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(noting “[t]he clear weight of authority holds that Rule 23 procedures are 
inappropriate for the prosecution of class actions under s 216(b)” and collecting 
cases); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(“Rule 23 cannot be invoked to circumvent the [§ 216(b)] consent . . . .  [Courts] 
have uniformly ruled that . . . Rule 23 [is] not applicable to [§ 216(b) cases].”); 
LaChapelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(finding a “fundamental, irreconcilable difference between” Rule 23 and § 216(b), 
and that the court “must apply [§ 216(b)] as it has been written” because it is 
“unambiguous”); Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 624 (S.D. Iowa 1946) 
(observing that § 216(b) “supersedes the Rules of Civil Procedure and is a statement 
by the ‘supreme power of the state’ as to who is entitled to be made parties to a 
suit”). 
 A group of employment defense litigators recently argued that Rule 23 does, 
and should, apply to § 216(b) collective actions.  Their argument was based on the 
theory that Rule 23, as a validly enacted rule under the Rules Enabling Act, is not 
inconsistent with § 216(b) and thus should apply to § 216(b) actions.  Allan G. King 
et al., You Can’t Opt Out of the Federal Rules:  Why Rule 23 Certification Standards Should 
Apply to Opt-In Collective Actions Under the FLSA, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).  This 
Article, however, sees the § 216(b) procedure, as originally envisioned and as 
properly applied, as a liberalized, party-initiated rather than court-supervised joinder 
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1. Early § 216(b) history:  facilitating aggregation of wage claims 
Enacted in 1938 as part of the FLSA and applicable to later 
employment laws codified in the same statutory chapter, § 216(b) 
provides that “[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any 
employer . . . by any one or more employees for . . . other employees 
similarly situated.”42  Under the initial statutory language, “collective 
actions” let employees have third-parties, mainly labor unions, file 
their wage suits—which drew colorful denouncements that such 
lawsuits filed by “an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of 
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all . . . may result 
in very decidedly unwholesome champertous situations.”43  To 
eliminate third-party suits, Congress amended § 216(b) in 1947 to 
require workers themselves to be the plaintiffs44 and to require 
anyone other than an original plaintiff to affirmatively “opt in” by 
filing a written consent,45 thereby codifying the opt-in rule already 
prevailing among the courts.46 
Enacted before modern class actions existed,47 § 216(b) does not 
mention any judicial gatekeeping power over whether a case can 
                                                          
procedure wholly inconsistent with the restrictive (rather than liberal) and judicially 
supervised (rather than party-initiated) procedure Rule 23 grants for class actions.  
Because applying Rule 23 to § 216(b) actions would substantially eliminate the 
applicability to § 216(b)-specific procedures, the proper statutory construction is to 
enforce Rule 23 for all actions except those governed by 216(b):  “[w]hen there are 
two [federal] acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both,” 
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United 
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
under the “repeatedly stated” rule that where two statutes “are in tension,” both 
“continue to apply” absent “irreconcilable conflict” or “clearly expressed 
congressional intention” to curtail one, Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219). 
 42. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 43. 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947), quoted in Arrington v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 531 F. 
Supp. 498, 501 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 44. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)); see Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft:  
How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 727, 731–32 (2010) (citing Fraser, supra note 20, at 98) (observing that 
the earlier version of the statute enabled uninterested parties to launch numerous 
“fishing expeditions [that] were costly to employers”). 
 45. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (noting 
that the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act added a “requirement that an employee file a 
written consent”). 
 46. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853–56 (3d Cir. 1945) (noting that 
before the 1947 opt-in statute, most courts let § 216(b) cases cover only those 
employees who affirmatively opted in). 
 47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (explaining that 
Congress enacted the modern version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure several 
decades after the FLSA). 
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proceed as a collective action.48  Section § 216(b) requires merely that 
members be “similarly situated” and opt in individually.49  One of the 
first § 216(b) cases denied a motion to dismiss after adopting a liberal 
definition of “similarly situated.”50  The court in McReynolds v. 
Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co.51 observed that workers joining a 
collective action “stand or fall along with” the named plaintiff, so if 
their claims fail, it will be at the later stage when the evidence does 
not “sustain the allegation that . . . [all] are similarly situated.”52  The 
“similarity” required was modest in other early decisions allowing § 
216(b) collective actions, such as McNorrill v. Gibbs,53 which found “no 
serious question about the two employees being similarly situated” 
when “both worked for the same employer during substantially the 
same period of time, and as stated in the complaint they ‘performed 
similar duties and were paid wages at the same time.’”54  Other early 
cases noted the importance of “liberally administer[ing]” § 216(b) to 
avoid “a multiplicity of suits”55 and because of the importance of 
collective actions to workers:   
[E]mployees . . . can join in their litigation so that no one of them 
need stand alone in doing something likely to incur the displeasure 
of an employer.  It brings something of the strength of collective 
bargaining to a collective lawsuit.56 
Some early courts, though, did not accept that the § 216(b) 
similarity standard was any broader than then-existing Rule 23 class 
action requirements.  In Sinclair v. United States Gypsum Co.,57 the court 
struck down a complaint alleging wage claims on behalf of plaintiffs 
and others “similarly situated,” reasoning that the § 216(b) suit failed 
Rule 23 elements, including that the class be “so numerous as to 
make [joinder] impracticable,”58 even though § 216(b) had no 
numerical threshold. 
                                                          
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 49. Id. 
 50. McReynolds v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 5 F.R.D. 61, 62 (W.D. Ky. 
1942). 
 51. 5 F.R.D. 61 (W.D. Ky. 1942). 
 52. Id. at 62. 
 53. 45 F. Supp. 363 (E.D.S.C. 1942). 
 54. Id. at 365. 
 55. Barrett v. Nat’l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 68 F. Supp. 410, 416 (W.D. Pa. 
1946) (“[Section 216(b)] should be liberally administered since it may be that other 
persons interested in the same common question of law or facts might desire to join 
as party plaintiffs and by . . . being permitted . . . a litigious situation would be 
corrected at one time.”). 
 56. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 57. 75 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1948). 
 58. Id. at 441–42. 
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2. Modern § 216(b) case law:  split authority but a common theme and 
 many collective actions rejected 
With the dramatic increase in the number of FLSA cases since the 
1990s,59 the modern § 216(b) case law is far more extensive than, and 
quite contrary to, the early cases detailed above.  Whether or not 
expressly citing Rule 23, courts adjudicating § 216(b) collective 
actions perform an essentially similar analysis, requiring of plaintiffs 
an evidentiary motion proving a substantial degree of commonality, 
as Rule 23 does.60 
Under one approach, courts explicitly apply the Rule 23(a) class 
action requirements to determine whether employees in a § 216(b) 
collective action are “similarly situated”:  whether the members are 
sufficiently numerous (Rule 23(a)(1)); whether common claims 
predominate (Rule 23(a)(2)–(3)); and whether there are conflicts of 
interest among the plaintiffs or their counsel (Rule 23(a)(3)–(4)).61  
While conceding that § 216(b) differs from, and cannot be trumped 
by, Rule 23, these courts have applied to collective actions all Rule 23 
elements not flatly inconsistent with § 216(b), including the four 
Rule 23(a) requirements, plus the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement for 
damages claims that common questions must “predominate” over 
individual ones.62  Some courts similarly require collective actions to 
establish the substantial commonality required of damages class 
actions under the original, pre-1966 version of Rule 23—because that 
rule, like § 216(b), required each plaintiff with damages claims to 
“opt in.”63 
                                                          
 59. See infra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. 
 60. For case dockets with scheduling orders requiring collective action 
certification motions, see, for example, Capsolas v. Pasta Res. Inc., No. 10-5595 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2010) (scheduling order); Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09-
2674 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (case management plan and scheduling order); Clarke 
v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 08-2400 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009) (stipulation and 
order of discovery and briefing schedule). 
 61. See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 132 F.R.D. 263, 266–68 (D. 
Colo. 1990) (specifying that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the “normal class 
actions requirements,” such as “numerosity, typicality, [and] adequacy”), abrogated in 
part by Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001); St. 
Leger v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 123 F.R.D. 567, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that 
certification was inappropriate and plaintiffs were not similarly situated because 
common questions did not “predominate” individual questions). 
 62. See, e.g., Burns v. Vill. of Wauconda, No. 99-C-0800, 1999 WL 529574, at *2–3 
(N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999) (denying certification on same Rule 23 analysis of § 216(b) 
certification as Shushan); Camp v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. H-97-1938, 1998 WL 
906915, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 1998) (citing Shushan and requiring § 216(b) 
plaintiffs to satisfy Rule 23); Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1456, 
1461 (D. Colo. 1995) (citing Shushan in applying the Rule 23 class action 
requirements). 
 63. See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 855 F.2d 1062, 1078–79 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing 
that “those who did not file individual charges and nevertheless forge ahead with 
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Most courts, however, do not expressly apply Rule 23, instead 
taking an “ad hoc” approach to whether workers are “similarly 
situated” enough for a § 216(b) collective action.  These courts apply 
a two-stage certification process that, though unique to § 216(b), still 
parallels key Rule 23 requirements; particularly, that class members 
must share strict commonality and that a collective action would be 
superior to multiple individual suits.64 
The process begins with the plaintiffs first filing a motion, as under 
Rule 23, seeking court “certification” of the collective action.65  Often 
called the “notice stage,” at this step the court decides whether a 
collective action is sufficiently proper to justify notifying potential 
members that they can opt into a collective action.66  Court approval 
of notice derives from the Supreme Court decision in Hoffmann-La 
Roche Inc. v. Sperling,67 which mentioned no “certification” process, 
but held that to serve the “broad remedial goal” of the FLSA, and in 
light of the “wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention,” 
courts can manage the notice and opt-in process.68  Courts call the 
burden of proving that plaintiffs are “similarly situated” at this stage 
“minimal”—just a “modest factual showing”69—but discovery is 
necessary.70  Courts require evidentiary proof (employee affidavits, 
corporate documents, etc.) that members are “similarly situated,”71 
challenge the same conduct,72 and faced “a common policy or plan 
                                                          
individual actions despite the district court’s erroneous ruling may find their actions 
defeated on a law of the case theory”); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 602 
(10th Cir. 1980) (considering an interlocutory appeal of a district court finding that 
“a prima facie case had been established showing that Sandia had engaged in a 
pattern or practice of discrimination against a portion of the protected class”). 
 64. Lopez, supra note 20, at 288–89; see also Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. 
Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing a two-step process that courts 
generally use to determine whether a collective action under FLSA may proceed); 
Sipas v. Sammy’s Fishbox, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 10319 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24318, at *6–7 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (citing that the plaintiffs “need show 
only ‘some identifiable factual nexus’” as a “minimal burden” for conditional 
certification). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(c). 
 66. Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74039, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006). 
 67. 493 U.S. 165 (1989). 
 68. Id. at 171–73. 
 69. Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8819 (GEL), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73090, at *8–10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 99 F.R.D. 89, 93 n.8 (D.N.J. 1983) (“[T]he Court set 
up a 45 day discovery period for . . . establishing the number of persons similarly 
situated . . . .  [P]laintiffs may [then] move to certify a . . . class to whom notice will 
ultimately be sent.”). 
 71. Gjurovich v. Emmanuel’s Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Realite v. Ark Rests. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 72. Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 104. 
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that violated the law.”73  After discovery is a second-stage certification 
motion, typically a defense motion to decertify; the court makes an 
even more searching evidentiary inquiry into whether members are 
similarly situated,74 decertifying the case if they are not.75 
Courts deny certification when they find insufficient evidence of, 
for example, common facts among members,76 common policies 
affecting all members,77 or common “employment settings” of all 
                                                          
 73. Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 74. Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74039, at *37–38 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006); Gjurovich, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 105 
n.1. 
 75. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 585 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming decertification because not all plaintiffs alleged same unlawful practices); 
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
decertification because employee duties and pay structures differed); Beauperthuy v. 
24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116, 1122–27 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(granting defendant’s motions to decertify because of plaintiffs’ varying 
circumstances and defendant lacking a uniform policy compelling unpaid work); 
Hernandez v. United Auto Credit Corp., No. 08-3404, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40209, 
at *10–15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (granting motion to decertify because employee 
duties and authority levels differed); Brechler v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. cv-
06-00940, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24612, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009) (decertifying 
class because a “subtler system of pressure and coercion,” not a unified policy, 
denied wages to employees); Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 567, 
576–87 (E.D. La. 2008) (decertifying class because of “the dissimilarity of plaintiffs’ 
self-reported job duties,” which made it “exceedingly difficult for Big Lots to assert its 
statutory exemption defense on a collective basis”); Proctor v. Allsups Convenience 
Stores, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 278, 282 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (granting defendant’s motion to 
decertify because “there is no evidence of a single decision, policy, or plan that is 
causing the Plaintiffs to work off the clock”); Sharer v. Tandberg, Inc., No. 06-626, 
2007 WL 676220, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2007) (granting motion to decertify 
because employees’ job titles and responsibilities were too dissimilar and named 
plaintiffs did not all allege same wage deprivations); Smith v. Heartland Auto. Servs., 
Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (D. Minn. 2005) (decertifying upon finding 
“significant the discrepancies between and among the named plaintiffs and the opt-
in class members with respect to a Store Manager’s ability to exercise discretion, 
perform management tasks, and act independently of the district manager”); 
Johnson v. TGF Precision Haircutters, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-03-3641, 2005 WL 1994286, 
at *2, *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2005) (decertifying because multiple sites varied and 
employer defenses were individualized observing that “if it were not for [issues such 
as geographic differences], the job duties per se might not require decertification”); 
Bayles v. Am. Med. Response of Colo., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1053, 1061–63 (D. Colo. 
1996) (decertifying because pay-docking policy was not consistent for all); Lusardi v. 
Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1987) (granting motion to decertify 
because of disparate employee duties and locations among ADEA plaintiffs). 
 76. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 6:07-cv-468, 2007 WL 4482581, 
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2007) (stating that plaintiffs failed to offer any basis of 
employer’s plan to deny overtime pay “on a company-wide scale” and observing that 
“federal courts across the Middle and Southern Districts of Florida have routinely 
denied requests for conditional certification where, as here, the plaintiffs attempt to 
certify a broad class based only [on] the conclusory allegations of few employees”); 
D’Anna v. M/A-Com, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that plaintiff 
failed to make the “modest factual showing” of an improper corporate policy and 
holding that “[t]he mere listing of names, without more, is insufficient absent a 
factual showing that the plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’”). 
 77. See, e.g., Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1307 (E.D. Cal. 
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members.78  On claims that the same employer denied many workers 
minimum and overtime wages, the district court in Sheffield v. Orius 
Corp.79 denied collective action certification because “members held 
different job titles, enjoyed different payment structures (piece-rate, 
hourly, and salaried), and worked at nine different job sites;” with 
each claim entailing individualized issues, the alleged violations arose 
differently among subdivisions, so members were “not related as 
victims of a uniform, national policy.”80  Similarly, in Bishop v. Petro-
Chemical Transport,81 a claim that an employer did not pay truck 
drivers required overtime,82 the plaintiff truck driver testified that he 
and other members were identical in key respects:  “(a) held the 
same job (truck drivers), (b) hauled similar products (bulk 
petroleum products), (c) were based within the State of California 
and (d) were not paid overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty 
per week.”83  But the court denied certification, deeming plaintiff’s 
“declaration . . . entirely deficient” because certification requires 
“evidentiary support” of worker similarity,84 and at this early stage—
before discovery was completed—plaintiff had “no strong evidence of 
company wide policies and corporate structure.”85 
A common thread is that many courts deny certification where 
alleged wrongs were decentralized among different managers, 
different sites, and different job categories—paralleling the Supreme 
Court’s rejection in Wal-Mart Stores of a Rule 23 class claiming sex 
discrimination among varied employees and managers.86  As detailed 
below, Rule 23-style inquiry in § 216(b) collective actions is 
                                                          
2008) (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring 
substantial commonality and finding “no evidence . . . that there is a company wide 
policy to deny, improperly, overtime to those who are entitled to overtime 
compensation”); Jimenez v. Lakeside Pic-N-Pac, L.L.C., No. 1:06-CV-456, 2007 WL 
4454295, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2007) (“Although Plaintiffs have presented 
evidence of a uniform policy of not precisely recording their hours, they have not 
come forward with any authority to suggest that this failure, in and of itself, violated 
the FLSA.”); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1951, 2006 WL 42368, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 6, 2006) (noting that the plaintiffs “failed to satisfy” a “more lenient standard” 
than “modest factual showing” of a corporate policy). 
 78. See, e.g., Pfohl v. Farmers Ins. Grp., No. 03-CV-3080, 2004 WL 554834, at *2–3 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2004) (noting additional factors that determine whether plaintiffs 
are similarly situated such as “the various defenses available to the defendant which 
appeared to be individual to each plaintiff” and “fairness and procedural 
considerations”). 
 79. 211 F.R.D. 411 (D. Or. 2002). 
 80. Id. at 413. 
 81. 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
 82. Id. at 1292. 
 83. Id. at 1296. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1307. 
 86. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–57 (2011). 
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misplaced; it neglects the very different text, history, and nature of 
each provision. 
II. HOW COURTS ARE WRONG 
The prevailing § 216(b) collective action certification process is 
excessive in many ways—in its importation of Rule 23 standards, in 
requiring evidentiary support on an early procedural motion, and in 
the complexity of the two-stage inquiry.  There is a far more 
fundamental problem, however:  there should be no collective action 
“certification” inquiry at all because there is no statutory or rule 
authority for requiring any such motion by plaintiffs. 
Part II.A explains that applicable statutory and rule text does not 
support judicial authority to deny § 216(b) plaintiffs the right to file 
actions that other similarly situated individuals can join.  This Part 
also elaborates that the historical development of Rule 23 and § 
216(b) confirms that § 216(b) is no analogue of modern Rule 23.  
Rather, § 216(b) and the old form of Rule 23, both enacted in 1938, 
liberalized joinder, allowing easy consolidation of similar damages 
claims.  The idea of courts scrutinizing the propriety of aggregation 
arose only in 1968, when the revised Rule 23 established modern class 
actions.  Rule 23 classes, unlike § 216(b) actions, allow named 
plaintiffs and class counsel to dispose of absent class members’ 
claims—an agency problem absent from collective actions, in which 
all participants affirmatively choose to participate. 
Part II.B then demonstrates that this is not a harmless error or a 
mere procedural technicality:  improper judicial scrutiny of collective 
actions prejudices the rights of workers claiming violations and leaves 
substantial violations without remedy. 
A. Why No Certification Inquiry:  The Text, History, and Nature of            
§ 216(b) 
1. Statutory text and purpose:  no judicial authority in § 216(b) to veto 
 plaintiffs’ litigation choices 
Normally, courts have little say in plaintiffs’ choice of counsel, 
choice to file jointly with others, or choice among permissible 
procedures (e.g., using diversity jurisdiction to choose federal over 
state court).  Plaintiffs pursuing a class action, however, face judicial 
inquiry into whether a class action is proper.  In fact, pursuant to the 
express language of Rule 23, they must file a motion proving the class 
is proper:  “the court must determine by order whether to certify the 
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action as a class action”87 and must “appoint class counsel,” who 
makes an “application” to the court showing they meet rule-
delineated criteria focusing on experience, resources, and skill.88 
Section 216(b), however, specifies a different procedure for a 
collective action, one lacking any judicial “certification” of plaintiffs’ 
“application” process:   
An action . . . may be maintained . . . [by] one or more employees 
for . . . other employees similarly situated.  No employee shall be a 
party plaintiff . . . unless he gives his consent in writing to become 
such a party and such consent is filed in the court . . . .89 
This text does not give courts the power to scrutinize the matters 
that Rule 23 regulates, such as the case’s status as aggregate litigation 
and plaintiffs’ choice of counsel.  There is no provision in § 216(b) 
for a “certification” inquiry like in Rule 23(c)(1), no provision for 
scrutiny of plaintiffs’ counsel like in Rule 23(g), and, more generally, 
no requirements analogous to those in the Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and 
Rule 23(b)(1)–(3) seven-subsection labyrinth.  Rather, § 216(b) 
requires only two criteria:  members must be “similarly situated” and 
must make one of the types of employment claims covered by § 
216(b) (minimum or overtime wage, age discrimination, or gender 
pay discrimination). 
Accordingly, regardless of whether judicial gatekeeping of 
collective actions under § 216(b) is good policy, it is unauthorized.  
In an adversarial legal system (like that of the United States), rather 
than an inquisitorial system (like most of Europe), parties can file 
and resolve lawsuits as they please, absent a specific rule granting 
judges authority over parties’ decisions.  Judicial scrutiny of a 
settlement in a non-class action is unauthorized:  lawsuits can be 
settled and dismissed with mutual consent under Rule 41(a), and, 
because that rule “does not . . . empower . . . court[s] to attach 
conditions to the parties’ stipulation of dismissal,”90 judges are 
uniformly reversed on rare occasions when they force parties to 
disclose settlement terms.91 
Courts do have one modest power over § 216(b) actions:  to 
control “notice” of opt-in rights sent to potential members.  The one 
                                                          
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)–(2). 
 89. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 90. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). 
 91. E.g., Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(finding “serious abuse of discretion” in court ordering disclosure of confidential 
settlement); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that 
settlement executes Rule 41 voluntary dismissal, “divest[ing]” court jurisdiction to 
order disclosure of settlement). 
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Supreme Court case on courts’ procedural powers in § 216(b) 
actions, Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, was a narrow holding:  § 
216(b) implicitly grants courts “managerial responsibility” over the 
opt-in process, and, “[b]y monitoring preparation and distribution of 
the notice, a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and 
informative.”92  The Court described such “trial court involvement in 
the notice process” as “inevitable,” at least in cases with “numerous 
plaintiffs.”93 
But a court’s notice decision is not a “certification” decision.  The 
Supreme Court held in Hoffmann-La Roche that a notice order is not a 
Rule 23 certification analogue, but a simple case management order 
under the modest Rule 83(b) provision, which provides that district 
judges “may ‘regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent 
with’ federal or local rules.”94  Notice will not even be necessary in all 
cases because plaintiffs can sue alone; the opt-in requirement means 
those who have not joined have no rights at stake in its outcome.95  
Notice is more powerful and comprehensive when court-ordered, but 
plaintiffs can use informal notice methods.  For example, ethics rules 
against soliciting clients do not apply to counsel strengthening 
clients’ cases by inviting co-plaintiffs; plaintiffs’ counsel can contact 
potential class members without court approval.96  The lack of 
universal need for court notice further confirms that judicial power 
over notice does not imply power to reject the entire collective 
action. 
Thus, plaintiffs can request notice and defendants can oppose it, 
just as the parties did in Hoffmann-La Roche. Arguably, the “inevitable” 
language of Hoffmann-La Roche lets courts sua sponte require plaintiffs 
to send court-approved notice.  On a contested motion on notice, the 
defendant would likely make its motion challenging the entire 
collective action, as detailed below, at the same time.  But neither 
judicial power over notice, nor plaintiffs’ motions for such notice, 
provides any support for a collective action “certification” inquiry. 
                                                          
 92. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1989). 
 93. Id. at 171. 
 94. Id. at 172 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b)). 
 95. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any 
such action unless he gives his consent in writing . . . .”). 
 96. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1981) (holding that order 
barring plaintiffs’ counsel from inviting potential class members’ participation 
“interfered” with counsel’s ability to “inform potential class members” and “obtain 
information about the merits,” and that any “order limiting communications 
between parties and potential class members” must be based on “specific findings . . . 
[of] potential abuses . . . [and] limit[] speech as little as possible”).  Gulf Oil was a 
Rule 23 class action but “[t]he same justifications apply in the context of [a § 216(b)] 
action.”  Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171. 
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2. No motion and just one common issue required by rules that closely 
 parallel § 216(b):  Rule 20 joinder and original Rule 23(a)(3)  “spurious         
 class actions” 
a. Collective actions as liberalized joinder, not Rule 23-style class 
 actions 
As detailed above, most courts appear to view § 216(b) as an opt-in 
only variation on modern Rule 23.  Section 216(b), a 1938 and 1947 
statute, was never created as a variant on modern Rule 23, which was 
enacted in 1966.97  Rather, § 216(b) closely parallels a different 
aggregate litigation device:  as originally understood, § 216(b) is a 
joinder rule, and a liberalizing one, with a streamlined process for 
more plaintiffs to join a case by filing a simple “written consent.” 
The one Supreme Court case on collective actions, Hoffmann-La 
Roche, does not address whether such cases require “certification” 
motions, nor the standard for such motions—but it repeatedly uses 
the word “joinder” for the process of similarly situated workers opting 
into a case.98  A worker filing a “consent form . . . fulfill[s] the 
statutory requirement of joinder,”99 the Court noted; its decision on 
court supervision of worker notification was based on courts’ 
“managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional 
parties.”100 
Perhaps Hoffmann-La Roche used the word “joinder” in only a 
general sense; but even more informatively, the case law 
contemporaneous with the enactment of § 216(b) constantly 
described § 216(b) opt-in as “joinder.”  Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,101 in 
allowing a § 216(b) suit in 1945 summarized the early 1940s case law 
on § 216(b):  “all think in terms of permissive joinder of parties.”102  
Many of the cases that the court cited in Pentland did not actually use 
the word “joinder,”103 but a survey of 1940s cases using the term 
confirms that Pentland was right:  many of the early cases viewed § 
216(b) as a form of joinder, not as a form of class action:   
• “The distinction between a true class action . . . [under] 
                                                          
 97. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1934 & Supp. V 1938) (enacting § 216(b)), and 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1946 & Supp. V 1947) (amending § 216(b)), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
23 (1966) (enacted 1966). 
 98. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 168, 171, 173. 
 99. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 170–71 (emphasis added). 
 101. 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 102. Id. at 855 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 853 (discussing three groups of cases interpreting the nature of § 
216(b)).  Pentland cannot be faulted; no Westlaw search for the word “joinder” was 
possible in 1946. 
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Rule 23 . . . and a joinder of suits by employees ‘similarly 
situated’ . . . is clear[] . . . .”104 
• “‘[This] is not a true class suit but is merely a unique 
representative action permitted by Section 16(b) of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, which section provides for permissive 
joinder of claims of other employees similarly situated.’”105 
• “Congress . . . by Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 . . . intended to permit a joinder of such suits by 
employees ‘similarly situated’ . . . .”106 
• “[T]he intention of Congress [was] to authorize the joinder 
of [wage] actions into one proceeding to prevent the 
necessity of separate actions where the questions of law and 
facts are the same and to, therefore, avoid the multiplicity 
of suits.”107 
Case law through the 1970s continued to describe § 216(b) as a 
“joinder” device.108  The view of § 216(b) as joinder apparently ended 
only after the 1966 enactment of modern Rule 23; modern class 
actions then became the predominant form of aggregate litigation.109  
This left the misimpression that § 216(b) collective actions are a 
tighter version of class actions (because of the opt-in requirement) 
rather than a liberalized version of joinder. 
Plaintiffs joining claims under Rule 20 need not do anything like 
what courts currently require of plaintiffs in a § 216(b) collective 
action.  Under Rule 20, plaintiffs suing together need not file any 
                                                          
 104. Calabrese v. Chiumento, 3 F.R.D. 435, 437 (D.N.J. 1944) (emphasis added) 
(denying dismissal). 
 105. Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 622–23 (S.D. Iowa 1946) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (denying dismissal). 
 106. Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1941) 
(emphasis added). 
 107. Winslow v. Nat’l Elec. Prods. Corp., 5 F.R.D. 126, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1946) 
(emphasis added). 
 108. E.g., Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108, 111 (N.D. Ill. 1977) 
(observing that § 216(b) “authorizes joinder of plaintiffs who file a consent”); Berry 
v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, No. 75-0711, 1976 WL 673, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1976) 
(recognizing § 216(b) as “merely a joinder provision”); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., No. 
74-536, 1975 WL 195, at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 1975) (“The liberal joinder device 
available under § 216 makes joinder simple.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective:  The 
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1851 n.98 
(2008) (“From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, the federal courts were unwilling 
to certify even relatively simple ‘single event/single situs’ mass accident torts as class 
actions, but by the late 1980s they were certifying far more complicated and 
multifaceted [classes]. . . .  The next decade brought a growing number of such cases 
into the national courts.”); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?  (And What 
Does It Mean for The Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
245, 287 (2008) (“[D]uring the 1970s and 1980s, federal courts interpreted . . . Rule 
23(b)(3) to allow . . . large-scale class actions . . . .”). 
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motion to allow joinder; they merely state all plaintiffs’ names 
together on the caption of their complaint.110  If more individuals 
want to join after the suit commences, Rule 24(b)(1), in express 
terms, requires them to file a motion to intervene as plaintiffs.111  The 
text of § 216(b) requires no motion for opt-in, mandating only that 
the new plaintiff “gives his consent in writing . . . and such consent is 
filed in the court.”112 
More importantly, the standards under Rule 20 (joinder) and Rule 
24 (intervention) are far more liberal than a class action-style seven-
part inquiry under Rule 23.  Joinder requires only that the parties sue 
about “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences,” and share just “any question of law or fact common to 
all plaintiffs.”113  Both requirements are permissive:  only one 
“common question” is required,114 even if plaintiffs differ in other 
ways or seek different relief;115 and the “transaction or occurrence” 
rule requires only “logically related events,”116 not the same events.117  
This liberal joinder standard dates to 1938, when the original Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated “the old formalistic approach”118 
of strict common law and code pleading in favor of broadly joining 
multiple parties.119  Ever since, courts have granted joinder broadly to 
serve “principles of trial convenience and efficiency.”120  Accordingly, 
                                                          
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1).  
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 113. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (requiring the 
same showing on an intervention motion; that a claim “shares with the main action a 
common question of law or fact”). 
 114. See Carye v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(observing that Rule 20 does “not require the precise concurrence of all factual and 
legal issues”); Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(recognizing that commonality of one legal or factual issue is sufficient). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(3) (providing that each party need not seek “all the 
relief demanded [because] [t]he court may grant judgment to one or more” 
separately). 
 116. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653 (3d ed. 2001 & 2011 Supp.); see also Montgomery v. 
STG Int’l, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the requirement 
that “claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions 
or occurrences” is met “if the claims are logically related”).  
 117. See Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting 
that “[a]bsolute identity of all events is unnecessary”). 
 118. Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation:  Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy 
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 815 (1989). 
 119. Id.; see John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 707, 707 (1976) (describing the public and judicial concern over repetitious 
litigation and inconsistency if and when several suits are handled independently). 
 120. Vulcan Soc’y of Westchester Cnty. v. Fire Dep’t of City of White Plains, 82 
F.R.D. 379, 384, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing “principles of trial convenience and 
efficiency” to support denying misjoinder motion in suit alleging discriminatory 
practices by fire departments); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 
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joinder extends to broad patterns, such as mass tort claims about 
defects or practices affecting many, or discrimination claims flowing 
from a company practice negatively impacting an entire group.121 
If Rule 20 requires so little to aggregate plaintiffs’ claims into one 
suit, then how can § 216(b), a statute liberalizing joinder procedure, 
be seen as requiring an evidentiary showing of greater commonality 
than traditional joinder?  The simple answer is that § 216(b) should 
not be misinterpreted in that manner. 
b. Collective actions as parallel to original Rule 23(a)(3) “spurious” 
 opt-in classes requiring no “certification” motion 
Courts incorrectly view § 216(b) collective actions as akin to 
modern Rule 23 classes requiring judicial oversight.  Rather, §216(b) 
originated at a time when Rule 23 authorized no such oversight.  The 
modern Rule 23(b), enacted in 1966, establishes three types of class 
actions, but the original Rule 23(a) from 1938 established a different 
set of three types:   
(a) If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before the court, . . . one or more, 
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on 
behalf of all, sue  . . . when the character of the right sought to be 
enforced [is:] . . . 
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a 
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the 
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; 
                                                          
U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (describing the “weighty policies of judicial economy and 
fairness” as strongly supporting a broadly construed joinder rule); Am. Ins. Co. v. St. 
Jude Med., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (D. Minn. 2009) (determining that joining 
insurance broker with insurer would promote a “‘just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination’ of all issues” (citations omitted)); In re DIRECTV, Inc., No. 02-5912, 
2004 WL 2645971, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004) (“The purpose of [Rule 20] is to 
promote trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes, 
thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.”); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547, 
549 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (“The permissive joinder doctrine is animated by several 
policies, including the promotion of efficiency, convenience, consistency, and 
fundamental fairness.” (citations omitted)). 
 121. See Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334 (holding that “the district court abused its 
discretion in severing the joined actions” because, though members suffered 
different effects, sufficient evidence of pattern of conduct and common issue existed 
regarding the defendant’s discriminatory policy); see also Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 
185 F.R.D. 139, 141, 143–44 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing joinder of former employees’ 
claims of age discrimination pattern); Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Grp., 185 F.R.D. 581, 589–
91 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence of conspiracy to join insurer and 
contractors on allegations that contractors, at insurer’s behest, collusively 
overcharged or used inadequately cheap materials); Kuechle v. Bishop, 64 F.R.D. 
179, 180–81 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (allowing joinder because defendant allegedly 
scheming with others to defraud plaintiff raised common question of duties 
defendant and conspirators owed). 
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(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of 
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the 
action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting 
the several rights and a common relief is sought.122 
The two most common types paralleled the two main joinder 
categories.  If plaintiffs sued on shared “joint” interests under Rule 
23(a)(1), the class automatically included all members—paralleling 
Rule 19 mandatory joinder.123  But if plaintiffs sued on “several” 
interests, like distinct damages claims, Rule 23(a)(3) authorized what 
courts called a “spurious class action,”124 covering only named 
plaintiffs and those who affirmatively opted in125—paralleling Rule 20 
permissive joinder and § 216(b) collective actions.126  Hence early 
giants of civil procedure such as Harry Kalven and James William 
Moore,127 and early courts applying Rule 23(a)(3),128 expressed the 
                                                          
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1938). 
 123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (1939) (requiring that “[s]ubject to the provisions of 
Rule 23 . . . persons having a joint interest shall be made parties” (emphasis added)). 
 124. See, e.g., Martinez v. Maverick Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 
1, 219 F.2d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 1955) (noting that 23(a)(3) “is termed the spurious 
class suit”); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 89 n.5 (7th Cir. 1941) (calling 
23(a)(3) case “the type denominated a ‘spurious’ class suit” (citation omitted)). 
 125. See, e.g., Martinez, 219 F.2d at 672 (noting that a ruling under 23(a)(3) “does 
not bind the class, but binds only those actually before the court”); Oppenheimer v. 
F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[M]embers of the class who are 
not joined . . . will not be affected . . . .  [T]he decision will only be res judicata as to 
the plaintiffs and the parties who have intervened.”); 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.60, at 23-439 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that “under 
original Rule 23 . . . in the spurious class action the judgment was conclusive only 
upon the parties and privies to the proceeding”). 
 126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1939) (providing that “[a]ll persons may join in one 
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences” (emphasis added)). 
 127. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 703 (1941) (quoting 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2240 (1st ed. 1938)); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 
116, § 1752 (“[S]ubdivision [23(a)(3)] was merely a device for permissive joinder of 
parties.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Rule 
23(a)(3) is merely a device for permissive joinder . . . .”); Martinez, 219 F.2d at 672 
(noting that a 23(a)(3) class, “formed solely by the presence of a common question 
of law or fact, is in reality a permissive joinder device”); Weeks, 125 F.2d at 89 n.5 
(“[A]s the Federal Rules provide for permissive joinder they should also provide for 
the counterpart, the [23(a)(3)] class action based on a common question of law or 
fact.”); Hunter v. S. Indem. Underwriters, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 242, 243 (E.D. Ky. 1942) 
(deeming 23(a)(3) “merely a ‘joinder device’” allowing those with “a common 
interest in the questions of law or fact . . . to participate”). 
 A few courts disagreed, but only in viewing Rule 23(a)(3) more liberally—as 
allowing automatic-inclusion, opt-out damages class actions—as under modern Rule 
23(b)(3).  E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588–89 (10th 
Cir. 1961) (surveying whether unnamed, non-opted-in plaintiffs can participate in 
23(a)(3) spurious class). 
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view that a spurious class suit “‘is a permissive joinder device.’”129 
Thus, Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions and § 216(b) collective 
actions were contemporary 1938 creations that courts viewed as 
similar:  both aggregated damages claims for only those who opted in 
and both were joinder liberalizations.  Some courts expressly linked § 
216(b) collective actions to Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions.  For 
example, in Pentland, one of the first appellate decisions on § 216(b), 
the court “classif[ied] the proceeding as a spurious class suit”130 and 
noted that the early district court § 216(b) cases also “classif[ied] 
themselves as spurious class actions.”131  Numerous other decisions, 
mostly from the era when original Rule 23 was in place, similarly cast 
§ 216(b) collective actions as “spurious” class actions analogous to 
those of original Rule 23(a)(3).132 
The most critical point about § 216(b) and original Rule 23(a)(3) 
is that neither required a “certification” motion of any kind.  The text of 
original Rule 23 required no such motion, and judicial practice at the 
time was that a case filed as a spurious class action, or a § 216(b) 
collective action, could proceed freely unless and until the defendant 
filed a motion challenging it.  Such a motion might be styled a 
“motion to strike” the complaint’s class allegations or a “motion to 
dismiss” the allegations.  Either way, the defendant had to make the 
motion and carry the burden.  That was true in early § 216(b) 
collective actions:   
• McNichols v. Lennox Furnace Co.133 denied a motion to dismiss 
the “allegation in the complaint that the employees in 
whose behalf the action is maintained are ‘similarly 
situated.’”134 
                                                          
 129. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 127, at 703 (citation omitted). 
 130. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945). 
 131. Id. at 855. 
 132. E.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A 
FLSA class action under § 216(b) is ‘spurious,’ wherein the res judicata effect 
extends only to the named parties, while in a ‘true’ Rule 23 class action, the res 
judicata effect of a judgment extends to the entire class.” (citations omitted)), 
abrogated by Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989); Kainz v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952) (“[S]purious class actions . . 
. have been approved where separate employees join to recover compensation under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.”); McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d 137, 
140 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that 1947 enactment of opt-in rule “limited the original 
[§ 216(b)] provision for a representative or class action—of the so-called ‘spurious’ 
form, not binding upon nonappearing parties—to require a definite consent in 
writing . . . before [one] could be thus represented” (citing Pentland, 152 F.2d at 
851)); Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553, 565 (D. Haw. 1948) 
(discussing “a spurious class action such as this brought under § 216 of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act”). 
 133. 7 F.R.D. 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1947). 
 134. Id. at 42 (explaining that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient 
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• Pentland v. Dravo Corp. reversed the grant of a motion “for 
judgment on the pleadings” against plaintiff’s lawsuit, 
seeking to include others similarly situated who were not yet 
plaintiffs.135 
• Kam Koon Wan v. E. E. Black, Ltd.136 granted the defendant’s 
motion for partial summary judgment, but without 
questioning the propriety of adjudicating the claims of 
“[t]he 313 persons similarly situated in whose behalf the 
original plaintiff also sued” and who under § 216(b) 
“sought to and succeeded in becoming parties plaintiff.”137 
In an identical manner, in the larger body of spurious class action 
case law, it was up to the defendant to move to dismiss or to strike the 
class allegations:   
• In Lipsett v. United States,138 the defendant filed a “motion to 
strike the allegations of a class action,” which the district 
court had granted before the Second Circuit reversed the 
dismissal.139 
• In Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,140 the Third Circuit approved 
the securities class action when ruling on a motion to 
dismiss.141 
• In Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,142 the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss targeted the class allegations and joinder of 
plaintiffs, with defendant moving only “that the class action 
be dismissed . . . [and] other plaintiffs named in the 
complaint be dropped.”143 
In none of these cases did any court question the procedural 
posture of leaving the defendant to file a motion challenging the 
propriety of a class action. 
The original Rule 23 drew criticism for letting plaintiffs sue without 
judicial scrutiny of whether class actions were proper.  Wright and 
Miller advocated judicial oversight:  “the court always should be free 
to strike . . . references to the representation of the absent persons, 
                                                          
because they “detail the nature of the work performed at the defendant’s place of 
business by the employees, and [also] specific recurring instances where . . . 
employees are required to perform services for which they have not been 
compensated”). 
 135. Pentland, 152 F.2d at 852. 
 136. 75 F. Supp. 553 (D. Haw. 1948). 
 137. Id. at 564. 
 138. 359 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 139. Id. at 958. 
 140. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). 
 141. Id. at 38, 49–50. 
 142. 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952). 
 143. Id. at 739. 
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and confine the litigation to those actually present, when the 
individual questions loom so large that convenient judicial 
administration will not be served by . . . a class action.”144  Yet Wright 
and Miller noted the lack of original Rule 23 authority for such 
oversight:  “It is not clear that this course could be followed in a 
federal court under the original rule.”145  Similarly, in Lipsett, one of 
the last appellate class action decisions under original Rule 23, the 
court noted there was less rationale for judicial supervision of spurious 
class actions because they bind only those who opt in, not absent class 
members unaware of the case.146 
In sum, § 216(b) collective actions originated at a time when Rule 
23 did not authorize the judicial oversight that it does today, and the 
similar Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class actions were particularly free of 
oversight.  Thus, the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 creating judicial 
oversight of true automatic-inclusion class actions does not grant 
authority for judicial oversight of opt-in § 216(b) actions. 
3. How the error started:  few precedents until a 1990s conflation of 
 approving “notice” and approving collective actions themselves 
If collective action “certification” was a mistake from the start, 
whose bad idea was it?  What case was the “patient zero,” infecting 
later courts with this now-pandemic error?  Often there is no clear 
“first” case in a line of authority:  several contemporaneous cases may 
hold similarly; or the first case may not be the most influential.  But 
here, a clear answer exists. 
For several decades after the enactment of § 216(b), there 
generally were no certification motions; the only collective action 
certification inquiries seem to be erroneous conflations of Rule 23 
and § 216(b) occurring when plaintiffs pled both.  Some plaintiffs 
just got it wrong, seeking a Rule 23 class for a § 216(b)-covered claim, 
and the court failed to correct the error.  In Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.,147 
the plaintiffs sued “under the ADEA only on behalf of a Rule 23 
class.”148  The court required plaintiffs to replace Rule 23 with § 
216(b) in the complaint, but it still ruled on “certification” of the § 
216(b) collective action after plaintiffs filed a certification motion:  
                                                          
 144. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 116, § 1752. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966); see Pirrone v. N. 
Hotel Assocs., 108 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“[B]ecause potential plaintiffs who 
do not opt in to an FLSA class action will not be bound by the court’s judgment, due 
process does not require notice to potential plaintiffs.”). 
 147. 99 F.R.D. 89 (D.N.J. 1983). 
 148. Id. at 93 n.7. 
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“Plaintiffs . . . seek certification under . . . [§ 216(b)] as an alternative 
to Rule 23. . . .  [U]nder this authority a class action can go 
forward.”149 
Other § 216(b) “certification” inquiries arose in “hybrid” actions 
when plaintiffs brought one § 216(b)-covered claim (e.g., EPA wage 
discrimination) and another to which Rule 23 applied (e.g., Title VII 
gender discrimination).  A hybrid could be a Rule 23 class action for 
one claim (e.g., Title VII) and a § 216(b) collective action opt-in 
action for the other (e.g., EPA),150 but some courts improperly 
required “certification” for both.  For example, in Hubbard v. 
Rubbermaid, Inc.,151 an EPA and Title VII hybrid,152 the court declared 
it would decide the propriety of a § 216(b) EPA collective action (on 
the EPA claim) on the same “certification motion” plaintiffs filed for 
the Rule 23 Title VII class:  “[On] plaintiff’s ability to maintain a class 
action . . . under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)[,] [t]he court will reach these 
questions when it considers the pending class certification motion.”153 
Despite oddities like Lusardi and Hubbard, § 216(b) “certification” 
inquiries were rarities for decades.  A search for § 216(b) certification 
motions is telling154:  of 836 cases, only 12 were before 1990, but there 
were 29 cases in the 1990s and 795 cases since 2000.  This sharp 
uptick only partly reflects the increased number of FLSA suits, which 
increased 348% from 1997 to 2007155 for reasons that “includ[e] 
economic pressures [and] the increased number of plaintiffs’ 
[employment] lawyers.”156  But the 1990s’ spike in certification 
inquiries also reflects the Supreme Court’s creation in Hoffmann-La 
Roche of a judicial role in supervising § 216(b) “notice.”  In 1995, the 
Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to accept the 
                                                          
 149. Id. at 93. 
 150. E.g., Godfrey v. Chelan Cnty. PUD, No. CV-06-00332, 2007 WL 2327582, at 
*2, *4 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2007) (allowing simultaneous Rule 23 class action for 
state-law wage claims and § 216(b) collective action for FLSA wage claims); 
Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same). 
 151. 436 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1977). 
 152. Id. at 1186. 
 153. Id. at 1186 n.1. 
 154. The search on Westlaw, last updated January 18, 2012, had the following 
parameters:  ((motion mov!) /s (class collective) /s certif! ) /p ( “216(b)” “626(b)” 
(flsa /s “16(b)”)). 
 155. See James C. Duff, Judicial Business of the United States Courts:  2007 Annual 
Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 150 (2007), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/front/JudicialB
usinespdfversion.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (tabulating 7310 FLSA suits in 
2007); Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts:  1997 
Annual Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 133 (1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1997/appendices/c2asep97.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (tabulating 1633 FLSA suits in 1997). 
 156. Ruan, supra note 44, at 735. 
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Court’s invitation with its decision in Mooney v. Aramco Services Co.,157 
which upheld, and delineated, a use of the now-standard two-step 
certification approach premised on a need for a ruling on Hoffmann-
La Roche notice:   
The first determination is made at the so-called “notice stage” . . . 
[as to] whether notice of the action should be given to potential 
class members. . . .  [T]his determination is made using a fairly 
lenient standard, and typically results in “conditional 
certification” . . . [and] putative class members [being] given 
notice . . . to “opt-in.” . . .  The second determination is typically 
precipitated by a [defense] motion for “decertification” . . . after 
discovery is largely complete.158 
Mooney is really the first precedent for the two-stage certification 
process, but it cited only two district court decisions as support, both 
of which were weak precedents.159  One spoke of certification only at 
the moment of “notice,” not as two stages.160  The other did use a two-
stage analysis but had especially little precedential value due to a 
tortured procedural history:  different judges had the case at each 
“stage,” and the opinion adopting a two-stage process was reversed on 
other grounds.161 
Oddly, Mooney is the leading precedent for a two-stage approach it 
“specifically [did] not endorse”:  “[T]he ‘opt-in’ plaintiffs were not 
similarly situated.  In so holding we specifically do not endorse the 
methodology employed by the district court, and do not sanction any 
particular methodology.”162  The two other precedents for applying 
                                                          
 157. 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 158. Id. at 1213–14. 
 159. See Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 392, 412 (D.N.J. 1988) 
(speaking of certification only at the moment of “notice,” not as two distinct stages), 
aff’d, 862 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 493 U.S. 165 (1989); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 
118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying originally a two-stage process; however, the 
opinion adopting that process was reversed on other grounds), mandamus granted sub 
nom. Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1988), modified sub nom. Lusardi v. 
Xerox Corp., 122 F.R.D. 463 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213 & n.6 
(finding both Sperling and Lusardi to be examples of two-stage analysis). 
 160. Sperling, 118 F.R.D. at 412. 
 161. Lusardi, 118 F.R.D. 351.  Mooney stated that Lusardi used the “two-step 
analysis.”  Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1213.  However, in Lusardi, different district judges 
handled each “stage,” and the declaration of a two-stage process came only in the 
second judge’s opinion—leaving unclear whether the analysis was purposely “two-
stage” or simply a second judge reversing the first.  Lusardi, 118 F.R.D. at 353 (Judge 
Lechner’s decertification decision, noting that Judge Stern’s certification decision 
was in 1983).  Also, the Lusardi decertification decision declaring a two-stage process 
was reversed and remanded on other grounds.  Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062.  On remand, 
the district court simply held in a brief decision that “this case is not suitable for class 
treatment” because of fact differences among plaintiffs, without further discussion of 
a two-stage inquiry.  Lusardi, 122 F.R.D. at 467. 
 162. Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1216. 
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the two-stage approach, the Tenth Circuit’s Hipp v. Liberty National 
Life Insurance Co.163 and the Eleventh Circuit’s Thiessen v. General 
Electric Capital Corp.,164 simply follow Mooney:  Hipp cited only Mooney as 
circuit authority;165 and Thiessen subsequently cited Mooney and Hipp.166  
District courts in the First,167 Second,168 Third,169 Sixth,170 Eighth,171 and 
Ninth172 Circuits cite Mooney, and sometimes Hipp and Theissen too, 
because of the lack of controlling appellate decisions in those 
circuits. 
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit got its analysis partly right before 
getting it wrong.  In Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,173 the court held that 
“section 216(b)’s ‘similarly situated’ requirement is less stringent 
than that for joinder under Rule 20(a).”174  Yet the court still required 
a certification motion where “plaintiffs bear the burden of 
demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for their claim [through] . . . 
detailed allegations supported by affidavits.”175  In Anderson v. Cagle’s, 
                                                          
 163. 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 164. 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 165. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218–19 (“The two-tiered approach [discussed in Mooney] . . 
. appears to be an effective tool for district courts to use in managing these often 
complex cases, and we suggest that district courts in this circuit adopt it . . . .”). 
 166. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102–03, 1105 (reasoning that “[a]rguably, the ad hoc 
approach is the best,” and other courts’ Rule 23-based analyses were incorrect 
because in § 216(b) cases, “Congress clearly chose not to have the Rule 23 standards 
apply[,] . . . instead adopt[ing] the ‘similarly situated’ standard”). 
 167. See, e.g., Kane v. Gage Merch. Servs., Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (D. Mass. 
2001) (citing Mooney as primary authority supporting its decision to “apply the ‘two-
step’ method”). 
 168. See, e.g., Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D. Conn. 2002) 
(citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit-level authority for the proposition 
that “[c]ourts utilize a two-step approach to certifying collective actions under the 
FLSA”). 
 169. See, e.g., Felix De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001) (citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit authority for holding 
that in “FLSA representative actions, a two tier method for the burden of proving 
similarly situated plaintiffs has developed”). 
 170. See, e.g., Murton v. Measurecomp, LLC, No. 07-3127, 2008 WL 5725631, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio June 9, 2008) (citing Mooney, Thiessen, and Hipp in observing that 
“[a]lthough the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the procedure for certifying a 
collective action under the FLSA, the clearly prevailing approach involves a two-stage 
process”). 
 171. See, e.g., Koren v. SUPERVALU, Inc., No. 00-1479, 2003 WL 1572002, at *15 
(D. Minn. Mar. 14, 2003) (citing Mooney as primary authority and sole circuit 
authority for the proposition that courts conduct a two-stage inquiry of “‘conditional 
certification’” and “factual determination;” if plaintiffs “are not similarly situated, the 
district court decertifies the class”). 
 172. See, e.g., Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (noting that “it appears the majority of courts prefer the ad hoc, two-tiered 
approach, as described in Mooney,” and also citing Hipp as authority for applying the 
two-tiered approach). 
 173. 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 174. Id. at 1096. 
 175. Id. at 1097. 
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Inc.,176 however, the Eleventh Circuit later joined the Tenth Circuit in 
rejecting a liberal joinder standard:   
[T]he lenient standard we adopted in [] Grayson [applies to] a 
certification decision early in the litigation before discovery . . . .  
The “similarly situated” standard at the second stage is less 
“lenient” than at the first, as is the plaintiffs’ burden . . . .  [T]he 
“similarly situated” standard at the second stage [is] “stricter” than 
that applied at the first stage . . . . [F]actors courts consider 
includ[e] “(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the 
individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to 
defendant[s] . . . individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) fairness and 
procedural considerations.” . . . [S]imilarities . . . must extend 
“beyond the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions.”177 
The premise of the two-stage process, as elaborated by Mooney and 
repeated frequently since, is plausible enough:  to order Hoffmann-La 
Roche notice, a court must deem the collective action proper; but that 
“notice stage” comes early in the case, so a court should revisit 
certification later, after discovery supports or undercuts the “similarly 
situated” allegations.  Yet, this logic alone is not enough because 
courts wield only those powers granted by statute or by rule.  As 
detailed above, given that § 216(b) was a liberalization of basic joinder, 
courts cannot disallow joinder of plaintiffs by requiring an evidentiary 
motion meeting a heightened joinder standard.178  While courts 
properly supervise “notice,” that simple exercise of Rule 83 case 
management power does not authorize courts to reject an entire 
collective action.  Thus, the only proper scrutiny a collective action 
faces is a Rule 12 dismissal or Rule 21 misjoinder motion, to either of 
which only the basic joinder requirement of a single common issue 
would apply. 
4. Less need for judicial scrutiny under § 216(b) than Rule 23:  claims 
 are presumptively similar, and opt-in lessens “agency” concern 
a. The presumptively similar nature of § 216(b) claims lessens the need   
 for judicial scrutiny of commonality 
The typical § 216(b) collective action is limited in subject-matter 
scope because it seeks unpaid wages by workers at the same 
employer.179  While § 216(b) currently includes two other types of 
                                                          
 176. 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 177. Id. at 952–53 (citations omitted). 
 178. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 179. See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 
2008) (discussing an FLSA suit for unpaid overtime wages among “[a]n opt-in class 
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claims—age discrimination and gender equal pay claims—§ 216(b) as 
enacted applied only to wage claims; the other two were added in the 
1960s, and wage claims “are by far the most common” and most 
significant type of § 216(b) action.180  Unlike Rule 23, which can apply 
to anything from mass tort to racism to bank fraud, § 216(b) applies 
only to a narrow range of subject matter, decreasing the odds that 
workers filing claims together are not sufficiently “similarly situated.”  
Accordingly, § 216(b) is a legislative determination that courts 
presumptively should allow aggregation into one lawsuit of claims 
filed under the same statute against the same employer. 
Occasionally, workers’ § 216(b) claims may vary too widely for a 
collective action.  While the typical § 216(b) collective action alleges 
that a certain pay practice affected all workers in a certain job 
category,181 a lawsuit conceivably could claim an adventurously wide 
array of FLSA violations.  An early § 216(b) opinion gave a dated 
example of claims that might vary too much:  “the claims of a 
plumber or a window washer or a scrub woman, each based on a 
separate contract of employment, might involve differing questions of 
law and of fact.”182  More modern examples of overly varied claims 
include delivery workers’ claims of sub-minimum wages,183 store 
salespeople’s claims that managers “manipulate employee time cards 
so as to avoid paying for wages earned during rest breaks or 
overtime,”184 and white-collar human resources or financial planning 
officers’ claims of being denied overtime under the FLSA 
administrative employee exemption.185  Less conceivably, wage 
plaintiffs might file jointly with age discrimination plaintiffs, though 
no such bizarre efforts are known to have ever occurred. 
The “similarly situated” requirement allows for denial of collective 
action status when plaintiffs’ claims vary too widely; however, as 
detailed above, the possibility of an overly broad § 216(b) action does 
                                                          
of 1,424 store managers” employed by the same discount retail store); Archuleta v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 543 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (considering an FLSA 
suit filed by a class of pharmacists all employed by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.).  
 180. Dorris supra note 8, at 1251. 
 181. See, e.g., Liu v. Jen Chu Fashion Corp., No. 00 Civ.4221 RJH AJP, 2004 WL 
33412, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2004) (claiming that both hourly workers and piece 
workers worked overtime without receiving overtime pay); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s 
Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (alleging that three 
supermarket corporations misclassified all of their delivery workers). 
 182. Lofther v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 45 F. Supp. 986, 988 (N.D. Ill. 1941). 
 183. See Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (distinguishing between delivery 
workers who make deliveries on foot and delivery workers who utilize different 
means). 
 184. Alix v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 868 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (App. Div. 2008). 
 185. Deng v. Searchforce, Inc., No. 11-00254, 2011 WL 940828, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 17, 2011). 
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not justify Rule 23-style judicial scrutiny that courts are not 
authorized to undertake and that Congress never envisioned as a part 
of § 216(b) adjudication.  Rather, as detailed in Part III below, courts 
can redress too-broad § 216(b) actions on defense motions arguing 
misjoinder or seeking to dismiss collective action allegations. 
b. Lack of agency problems because § 216(b) requires opt-in, not 
 automatic inclusion 
Ultimately, the key question is whether § 216(b) actions feature the 
“principal-agent problem” that justifies close judicial scrutiny of class 
actions:  that class counsel, with the named plaintiffs’ collusion or 
indifference, can sell out or neglect the interests of the masses of 
unnamed class members.186  Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller give 
a classic summary of the agency problem:   
[P]laintiffs’ class . . . attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs 
who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise 
nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.  
The absence of client monitoring raises the specter that the 
entrepreneurial attorney will serve her own interest at the expense 
of the client. . . .  [E]xisting regulations are extraordinarily 
ineffective at aligning the interests of attorney and client . . . .187 
Such agency problems may arise innocently, as class members defer 
to counsel for various reasons:  counsel’s greater expertise and 
cultivation of the client relationship; named plaintiffs’ receipt of 
court-authorized “incentive payments” making them 
disproportionately pleased with the case outcome;188 and the disparity 
between counsel’s heavy stake and each member’s modest stake.189  
Less innocently, because of unlawful “kickbacks” from attorneys, 
                                                          
 186. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 15, at 609.  
 187. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 3; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 292 (asserting 
that class actions “confer[] vast discretion on plaintiffs’ attorneys,” “creating 
principal-agent problems that remain intractable despite repeated efforts by 
Congress and the courts to curb highly visible abuses”); Alexandra Lahav, 
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 65 (2003) 
(criticizing class actions as “governed by [plaintiffs’] attorneys with limited judicial 
oversight”); cf. Beisner et al., supra note 17, at 1451 (noting plaintiff attorneys’ 
responses to charges that they take on class actions only to reap large profits). 
 188. See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives:  An Examination of Incentive 
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 411–25 (2006) (discussing why incentive payments are appropriate 
for named plaintiffs based on, among other considerations, the disproportionate 
amount of risk they assume compared to unnamed members of a class). 
 189. See Lahav, supra note 187, at 126 (asserting that “direct and active class 
member participation” in class actions seeking small per-person recoveries is 
infeasible because “participation is too expensive in relation to the interests at 
stake”). 
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named plaintiffs may allow high legal fees such as those paid by the 
now-notorious, but once well-respected, plaintiff-side class action firm 
Milberg Weiss.190 
Rule 23 has always granted judges unusual powers to police the 
decisions of class members and attorneys on matters courts normally 
have no authority to scrutinize.  Even original Rule 23’s modest 
requirements included judicial scrutiny of settlements;191 the far 
stricter modern Rule 23 requires plaintiffs to file a class certification 
motion proving that:  (1) their class is numerous enough to make 
joinder impractical; (2) members’ claims are similar enough; and (3) 
class counsel are sufficiently qualified.192  Academics persuaded of 
agency problems, though, propose even more class action 
restrictions:   
• using opt-in for Rule 23 classes,193 because opt-in cases 
create “competition” as multiple firms “litigate opt-in 
class[es] . . . with the same defendants”194 and are “less likely 
to overwhelm defendants”;195 
• creating “guardians ad litem to represent the interest[s]” of 
small-claims class members and to assure scrutiny of 
settlements and fees;196 
• stressing class member “exit” rights (i.e., opt-out) more 
than “voice” rights (i.e., lead plaintiffs’ influence), because 
exit “encourage[s] a competition that directly benefits the 
class member,” while “voice . . . cause[s] counsel to curry 
favor with a limited number” of plaintiffs;197 
• requiring more detailed class disclosures so members can 
police counsel better as to settlements198—or, in the view of 
other critics, requiring less disclosure because its cost risks 
                                                          
 190. See Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Given a 30-Month Prison Term for 
Hiding Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at C3 (reporting that a federal district 
judge sentenced Melvyn I. Weiss to 30 months in prison, fined him $250,000, and 
ordered him to pay $9.8 million in forfeitures following Weiss’s conviction for 
covering up illegal plaintiff kickbacks). 
 191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1938) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court.”). 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 193. See, e.g., John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1419, 1447 (2003) (advocating for Rule 23 opt-in due to the “public character of 
adjudication as opposed to settlement”). 
 194. Coffee, supra note 17, at 338. 
 195. Id. at 344. 
 196. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4; see Lahav, supra note 187, at 128 
(proposing judicial appointment of a “‘devil’s advocate’” to scrutinize settlements 
otherwise lacking adversarial scrutiny). 
 197. Coffee, supra note 17, at 328–29. 
 198. Lahav, supra note 187, at 123. 
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the competing agency problem of under-incentivizing 
attorneys;199 and 
• holding court-run “auction[s] for plaintiffs’ claims, under 
which attorneys (and others) could bid for the right to 
bring the litigation and gain the benefits,” in order to 
create a more competitive market for serving classes.200 
Others see agency cost fears as overblown or insufficient to justify 
restrictions that can stifle reform-minded class actions.201  
Nonetheless, arguments for restricting class actions have the upper 
hand, with politicians blasting class action lawyers for betraying their 
clients,202 and Congress continuing to enact restrictions.203 
In two critical ways, however, § 216(b) collective actions lack the 
key agency concerns that justify judicial scrutiny of Rule 23 class 
actions.  First, under § 216(b), only those who affirmatively opt in are 
participants; only opt-ins are bound by any judgment, are party to any 
settlement, or otherwise have rights at stake in the decisions of class 
counsel.204  Second, § 216(b) opt-ins are actual “party plaintiff[s],” not 
just unnamed class members.205  Not only must each potential 
plaintiff individually decide to join a collective action, but typically 
each must personally participate in discovery.206  In Krueger v. New York 
                                                          
 199. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4 (“The high cost of notifying absent 
class members when potential recovery is very small deters entrepreneurial attorneys 
from bringing meritorious suits.  Thus, the rule harms, rather than protects, absent 
class members.”). 
 200. Id. at 6. 
 201. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers 
Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 331–32 (defending controversial “fraud-on-the-
market class-action lawsuit[s]” by arguing that “[d]espite the weakness of its 
compensatory justification, the cause of action serves important deterrence functions 
that are unlikely to be equally well performed by public enforcement”); Gilles & 
Friedman, supra note 17, at 104–05 (“Where the conventional wisdom has gone 
wrong, however, is in condemning [the conflict between class action plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ profits and their clients’ interests] as a bad thing and proposing reforms for 
class action practice designed to correct this conflict by increasing the compensation 
of absent class members.”); Ruan, supra note 188, at 421–22 (defending incentive 
payments to named plaintiffs, at least in public interest litigation, where collusion 
risk is lower while benefit of litigation is higher). 
 202. See SEN. ORRIN HATCH, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2003, S. REP. NO. 
108-123, at 32 (2003) (“Abusive class action settlements in which plaintiffs receive 
promotional coupons or other nominal damages while class counsel receive large 
fees are all too commonplace.”). 
 203. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)) (codifying a “consumer class action bill of rights” and 
expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to take many class actions out of state courts, 
based on concerns with forum-shopping, unscrupulous class action attorneys, and so-
called professional plaintiffs). 
 204. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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Telephone Co.,207 for example, the court noted that, because “each” of 
the 156 opt-in plaintiffs “freely chose[] to participate and . . . ha[d] 
relevant information,” each had to participate in written discovery 
(including interrogatory questions and document demands), and 
one-quarter of them had to give deposition testimony.208  Where there 
are fewer than one hundred plaintiffs, courts have allowed written 
discovery and depositions of each individual opt-in plaintiff.209  
Indeed, on certification motions, plaintiffs regularly offer sworn 
testimony from opt-ins on their individual claims.210 
Because § 216(b) collective actions litigate the rights of only 
named plaintiffs and those who affirmatively opt in, there simply are 
no § 216(b) class members unknown to the court, unaware of the 
case, or unwilling to participate.  To be sure, in a large collective 
action, some of the hundreds or thousands of opt-ins might pay little 
more attention than the average Rule 23 class member.  But the 
absent-plaintiff problem in Rule 23 classes occurs when a plaintiff is 
unaware of the case or, though nominally aware, too uninformed to 
make a decision about participation.  In contrast, “opt-in class 
members, having elected to participate, are unlikely to be so 
indifferent” as unnamed Rule 23 class members211 because, among 
other things, these opt-in plaintiffs typically face individualized 
discovery. 
A § 216(b) opt-in plaintiff who pays little attention to the case is no 
different from a plaintiff in a one-party lawsuit who defers to counsel 
rather than actively participating in the litigation process.  Federal 
                                                          
 207. 163 F.R.D. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 208. Id. at 449 (requiring 39 of the 156 plaintiffs to appear for depositions). 
 209. See, e.g., Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman Inc., No. 91 Civ. 1675, 1994 WL 652534, 
at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) (allowing defendants to demand documents and 
depositions from each member of a fifty-plaintiff ADEA collective action); Kaas v. 
Pratt & Whitney, No 89-8343, 1991 WL 158943, at *1, *3–5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1991) 
(allowing interrogatories, document demands, and depositions from each opt-in 
plaintiff in an approximately one hundred-member ADEA collective action). 
 210. See, e.g., Declaration of Justin M. Swartz in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Conditional Certification & Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section 216(b) of 
the FLSA at 5, 7, Cruz v. Hook-Superx, LLC, No. 09-7717, 2010 WL 3069558 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2009) (listing declarations of seven opt-in plaintiffs); Declaration of 
Anjana Samant in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification & 
Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA at 5, Mohney v. 
Shelly’s Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, No. 06-4270, 2008 WL 7863650 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2007) (attaching excerpts of depositions of two opt-in plaintiffs); 
Declaration of Justin M. Swartz in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional 
Certification as an FLSA Collective Action & for Court-Authorized Notice Pursuant 
to Section 216(b) of the FLSA at 2–6, Hens v. ClientLogic Operating Corp., No. 05-
00381, 2006 WL 2795620 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2005) (listing declarations of forty-nine 
opt-in plaintiffs). 
 211. Coffee, supra note 17, at 333. 
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rules do not require personal participation by plaintiffs, nor do they 
protect those who remain uninformed; only Rule 23 so protects, and 
it only protects unnamed class members at the risk of having their 
rights abrogated in lawsuits they neither filed nor affirmatively joined. 
When claims are aggregated only by affirmative opt-in, rather than 
by automatic inclusion in a class action, “[t]here is really no question 
of adequacy of representation.”212  In Lipsett v. United States, the court 
explained that more judicial scrutiny is unnecessary when a class 
includes only those who affirmatively opt into the case:   
[B]ecause Rule 23(a)(3) is merely a device for permissive joinder, 
there should be little, if any, inquiry into whether the class is of 
appropriate size . . . .  Unlike the “true” class action, . . . non-party 
members are not bound by the judgment . . . .  [I]n fact there is no 
representation at all, of non-party members.213 
At least one § 216(b) decision has made the same point.  The 
district court in Pirrone v. North Hotel Associates214 addressed a narrower 
issue, but it held “notice to potential plaintiffs” unnecessary based on 
the same rationale that opt-in actions pose no threat to class 
members who do not affirmatively join:  “because potential plaintiffs 
who do not opt into an FLSA class action will not be bound by the 
court’s judgment, due process does not require notice to potential 
plaintiffs.”215 
Thus, courts and commentators who think that Rule 23 safeguards 
apply to § 216(b) collective actions are missing a key distinction:  § 
216(b) actions do not feature the agency problem of class counsel 
selling out unaware members, which is the rationale for such 
safeguards in class actions.  Agency problems certainly may exist to 
some degree in a § 216(b) case when clients have low stakes, low 
education, or unethical attorneys, but such problems, which are 
always possible in individual and multi-party litigation alike, can and 
should be redressed by existing ethics and court rules, as detailed 
below.216 
B. Serious Consequences of the Erroneous Certification Motion Process 
It is no mere ministerial error of procedure when, on a § 216(b) 
collective action, courts require a collective action “certification” 
motion and apply a heightened Rule 23 analysis rather than a simple 
                                                          
 212. Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 213. Id.  
 214. 108 F.R.D. 78 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
 215. Id. at 82. 
 216. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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joinder inquiry.  These stricter requirements have serious 
consequences for collective actions.  Without rehashing the entire 
debate over whether procedure should, or even can, be kept separate 
from claim substance or merits,217 the § 216(b) collective action 
procedure is a procedural device predominantly for FLSA minimum 
and overtime wage rights.  Therefore, courts’ procedural errors are 
inextricably linked with the wage rights they prevent from being 
vindicated. 
1. The high stakes:  widespread, high-dollar wage violations 
Studies and reported cases alike show workers are routinely denied 
statutory workplace rights,218 especially low-wage workers’ wage rights.  
Workers in construction,219 garment factories,220 nursing homes,221 
agriculture,222 poultry processing,223 and restaurants224 have suffered 
                                                          
 217. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1282–83 (2002) (arguing that depicting “a sharp divide 
between procedure and substance . . . ignores decades of judicial frustration 
grappling with the procedure/substance dichotomy”); Robert M. Cover, For James 
Wm. Moore:  Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732–33 (1975) 
(disputing the view “that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust action . . . and 
an environmental class action . . . are sufficiently identical to be usefully 
encompassed in a single set of [procedural] rules which makes virtually no 
distinctions [between them]”); Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal 
but Could Be Better:  The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 889, 918 (2009) (“Accurate cost-benefit analysis of the value of evidence is 
impossible without considering case merits, because the benefit of evidence (helping 
a plaintiff prove a case) is highest when the plaintiff’s claim has enough merit that 
the factfinder is permitted, but not compelled, to rule for the plaintiff.”). 
 218. See Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers:  Violations of 
Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, UNPROTECTEDWORKERS.ORG, 9 (2009), 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 
(explaining that the authors have found numerous violations of workplace laws and 
warning that existing protections are not meeting the needs of workers in low-wage 
industries). 
 219. See Strouse v. J. Kinson Cook, Inc., 634 F.2d 883, 884–86 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1981) (per curiam) (granting construction workers attorneys’ fees on winning FLSA 
claims); Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 258, 262 (D. Md. 2006) (certifying 
FLSA action by day laborers denied daily wages for cleaning Hurricane Katrina 
debris). 
 220. See, e.g., Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (precluding discovery of immigration status of workers seeking 
unpaid wages). 
 221. See, e.g., Hamelin v. Faxton-St. Luke’s Healthcare, No. 6:08-CV-1219, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9793, at *32–34 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009) (certifying FLSA action by 
health care employees claiming compulsion to work during unpaid breaks). 
 222. See, e.g., Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Servs., Inc., 8 F.3d 1018, 1022, 1024–27 
(5th Cir. 1993) (discussing history and scope of FLSA agricultural exemption). 
 223. See, e.g., Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502–03, 528 (D. 
Md. 2009) (entering judgment on poultry processing plant workers’ claim of unpaid 
work-time required to don and doff personal protective equipment), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 650 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 224. See, e.g., Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 347, 353–54 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (declining to vacate arbitration award for employees not paid overtime 
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systematic unlawful wage losses.  One survey of workers in low-wage 
industries225 in the three largest United States cities found 26% were 
paid below minimum wage, and over 75% were not paid overtime 
due the previous week.226  The magnitude of violations shown by that 
study is substantial:  the workers lost, and the employers illegally 
retained, an average of $56.4 million dollars per week.227  Another 
study reports similar findings:  annually, “[b]illions of dollars in 
wages are being illegally stolen from millions of workers.”228  In short, 
workers who can ill-afford wage loss are losing a great deal.  As 
detailed below, such wage violations, primarily affecting low-wage 
workers, go without remedy when courts disallow collective actions. 
2. Aggregate litigation is the sole feasible enforcement mechanism for  masses    
 of individually small claims 
Aggregating claims can be the only realistic redress for multiple 
claims too small for individual litigation, as the Supreme Court has 
noted repeatedly in Rule 23 cases.229  Employment claims typically 
seek modest individual damages,230 especially wage claims alleging 
                                                          
wages). 
 225. See Bernhardt et al., supra note 218, at 2, 4 (explaining that the survey of 4387 
workers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City captured violations often going 
underreported in a variety of low-wage jobs, including in the garment industry, 
domestic work, restaurants, and retail). 
 226. Id. at 21, 33. 
 227. Id. at 50. 
 228. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA 6 (2009). 
 229. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“[Class 
actions] overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action . . . by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth . . . [the] labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (“Class actions . . . permit 
the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”); 
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not 
economically feasible to obtain relief within . . . a multiplicity of small individual suits 
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may 
employ the class action device.”); see also ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 24:64 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that class actions produce 
larger fee awards by creating substantial recovery funds). 
 230. Even employment discrimination claims, typically about terminations from 
five-figure jobs rather than just wage underpayments, yield modest recoveries.  See 
Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 705–06 
(explaining that a study using statistics from the year 2001 showed that of the small 
fraction (3.8%) of race-based discrimination cases proceeding to trial verdicts, 
plaintiffs lost 61.9%; when they won, the median verdict was just $130,500); see also 
Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes:  An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment 
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 144 & n.134 (2007) (observing 
that employment discrimination settlements, though far more common than trials, 
yield even less—a median of $30,000, well below the personal injury case median 
($181,500)). 
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that hundreds or thousands of individuals were underpaid a small 
amount per hour.231  The modest damages make most wage claims 
prohibitively costly to prosecute individually232:  an individual case 
worth a few thousand dollars is not worth the attorney time necessary 
for the required discovery and motions;233 it hardly is even worth the 
thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket costs for witness transcripts 
alone.234  A chance at statutory attorneys’ fees provides insufficient 
incentive in individual cases, as the typically modest settlement 
amounts do not leave much for fees and courts routinely reduce even 
prevailing attorneys’ fees.235 
Moreover, individual litigation requires one plaintiff to shoulder all 
litigation costs and risks herself.  This includes not only out-of-pocket 
                                                          
 231. See, e.g., Phelps v. 3PD, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 548, 563 (D. Or. 2009) (recognizing 
superiority of class actions in employment cases due to typically small size of 
individual awards); Chase v. AIMCO Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.D.C. 
2005) (“[I]ndividual wage and hour claims might be too small in dollar terms to 
support a litigation effort . . . .”); Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 P.3d 
194, 209 (Cal. 2004) (“[T]he class suit . . . provides small [overtime] claimants with a 
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to 
warrant individual litigation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  See generally Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 373, 385–86 (2008) (discussing factors that limit workers’ access to the 
court system, including the small size of individual claims). 
 232. See Jarvaise v. Rand Corp., 212 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2002) (suggesting that a 
class action would be “superior” to other litigation alternatives in the case because it 
would prevent judicial waste and ensure that those unable to afford attorneys in 
individual suits will have “their day in court”); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 
109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that attorneys do not take contingency 
cases with low potential payouts); Scott v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 210 F.R.D. 261, 263, 268 
(D. Conn. 2002) (deeming class action the superior method for overtime claims 
partly because “cost of individual litigation is prohibitive”); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s 
Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting individual suits may 
be infeasible given workers’ lack of “adequate financial resources,” “access to 
lawyers,” “fear of reprisals,” and “the transient nature of their work”); Juliet M. 
Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering:  Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law Agenda, 
20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 201, 248–49 (2006) (“[T]he wage and hour cases of the 
working poor . . . tend to involve relatively small dollar figures, prohibitively small for 
a private attorney.”). 
 233. Discovery and legal fees are less costly than commonly assumed, but still well 
above what is feasible for individual wage claims.  See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769–70 
(2010) (reporting that a survey of federal cases in 2008 showed “median litigation 
costs, including attorneys’ fees, of $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants” 
“[i]n cases in which one or more types of discovery was reported”). 
 234. A one-day deposition rarely costs under a thousand dollars for court reporter 
transcription services because a transcript of 300–500 pages typically costs about 
$3.50 per page.  See, e.g., What Are Your Corporate Rates?, NAPLES REPORTING, 
http://www.naplesreporting.com/faq/rates/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing 
further that digital reporters cost $2.75 per page). 
 235. See, e.g., Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of 
Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2007) (opining on attorney fee motion that 
“[the] court (unfortunately) bears the burden of disciplining the market, stepping 
into the shoes of the reasonable, paying client, who wishes to pay the least amount 
necessary to litigate the case effectively”). 
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litigation expenses, which attorneys are reluctant to bear for modest 
claims, but also, especially for low-wage workers, a risk of employer 
retaliation236 and costly time off from hourly-paying work (often 
involving a job with long or inflexible hours) to help craft allegations, 
review facts, etc.237  Due to the limited prospect of individual 
litigation, employers inclined to violate wage laws face little financial 
incentive to comply. 
Furthermore, government enforcement is not sufficiently 
widespread or aggressive for substantial deterrence.  The agencies 
enforcing employment laws lack the resources to investigate many 
individual cases.238  Even when filed, government actions rarely 
achieve full damages or industry-wide relief.239  For example, 
investigators at the federal Department of Labor Wage and Hour 
Division are instructed not to include the double damages permitted 
by law in negotiations with employers, and to seek back pay for just 
two years of the three that the statute of limitations allows.240  Also, 
                                                          
 236. See Ruan, supra note 188, at 410–11 (describing potential forms of retaliation 
such as job loss, “being assigned to less favorable tasks,” “ostraci[sm] from co-
workers” and even being “black list[ed]” by their industries). 
 237. See Braun v. Wal-Mart, Inc., No. 19-CO-01-9790, 2003 WL 22990114, at *12 
(D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2003) (“[M]embers of the class have little practical ability to 
prosecute their claims in separate actions, in light of the substantial cost associated 
with gathering and presenting the evidence . . . .  [I]ndividual claimants effectively 
would be denied any remedy because the expense of prosecuting individual claims 
likely would vastly exceed the [recovery] amount . . . .”); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 9 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 570 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that any recovery may be reduced by 
expenses such as “travel expenses and time off from work”); see also Ruckelshaus, 
supra note 231, at 387 (“As the fight in court against the employer progressed, the 
individual worker would have to continue to make period fee payments [to his 
lawyer], pay for discovery, preliminary discovery motions, and any substantive legal 
motions filed by either side.”). 
 238. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR:  WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES 
LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 9 (2009) (reporting that 
Department of Labor staff admitted to being short on resources, and that as a result 
not all reported cases are adequately addressed); Elizabeth J. Kennedy, The Invisible 
Corner:  Expanding Workplace Rights for Female Day Laborers, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 126, 153 (2010) (“The underfunding of labor and employment law enforcement 
agencies has perpetuated an informal domestic work economy with minimum 
consequences for employers who ignore the few workplace rights that domestic 
workers do possess.”); Just Pay:  Improving Wage and Hour Enforcement at the United 
States Department of Labor, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT 15 (2010), www.nelp.org/page/-
/Justice/2010/JustPayReport2010.pdf?nocdn=1 (advocating that Wage and Hour 
Division “develop a tiered triage system to sort worker complaints into high-, 
medium-, and low-priority levels”). 
 239. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment 
Discrimination Cases:  A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 772–73 (2008) 
(arguing that EEOC fails to secure full damages available under anti-discrimination 
law). 
 240. See Just Pay:  Improving Wage and Hour Enforcement at the United States Department 
of Labor, supra note 238, at 10 (“[T]he [Wage and Hour Division]’s Field Operations 
Handbook . . . instructs WHD investigators only to seek up to two years of back 
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because most government investigations are driven by a particular 
claim, investigators are not required to expand their investigations to 
include a claimant’s similarly-situated coworkers, even though 
employers typically subject all workers in a job category to the same 
pay practices.241 
Wage claims thus make far more economic sense to litigate in 
aggregate rather than individual private lawsuits.  Collective actions 
limit the above-detailed burdens on any one worker and increase the 
amount in controversy, justifying an attorney’s investment of time 
and out-of-pocket expense, especially because litigation costs do not 
increase proportionately with the number of workers participating.  
Courts may assess back wages based on statistical or representative 
evidence,242 because liability evidence (e.g., that a certain job is not 
exempt) typically does not require testimony from every worker,243 
and because sample testimony suffices for the estimates needed in 
wage violation cases.244 
3. Importance of notification for workers unaware of violations 
Employees are often unaware their rights have been violated,245 
                                                          
wages, and not liquidated damages, which are nearly universally awarded under the 
statute, and does not instruct them to consider whether the violations are willful and 
subject to a three-year statute of limitations.”). 
 241. Cf. id. at 9–10 (recommending that the government “identify industries 
marked by rampant employment law violations” and target those industries through 
proactive investigations instead of solely following up on individual complaints). 
 242. See, e.g., Martin v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 952 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 
1992) (considering when back pay is to be awarded “to the nontestifying employees 
based on the fairly representative testimony of the testifying employees”). 
 243. See, e.g., Grochowski v. Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing that “not all employees need testify in order to prove FLSA violations or 
recoup back-wages”); Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(condoning the use of testimony of twenty-two of seventy employees because 
“[c]ourts commonly allow representative employees to prove violations with respect 
to all employees”); McLaughlin v. Ho Fat Seto, 850 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(disagreeing with the defendant’s contention that no pattern of FLSA violations 
could be proven because only five of twenty-eight employees testified); Donovan v. 
Simmons Petroleum Corp., 725 F.2d 83, 86 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 
testimony of twelve employees supported award to all workers after clarifying that not 
all injured workers need to testify to establish a prima facie case); Donovan v. New 
Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court’s 
use of twenty-three employees’ testimony to support award to 207 employees). 
 244. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946) (noting 
that hours may be proven by oral testimony because “[e]mployees seldom keep . . .  
records [of their hours] themselves”). 
 245. See Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 566 (Cal. 2007) (“[I]ndividual 
employees may not sue because they are unaware that their legal rights have been 
violated.”); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100 
(N.J. 2006) (“[W]ithout the availability of a class-action mechanism, many consumer-
fraud victims may never realize that they may have been wronged.”). 
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especially the low-wage, often immigrant workers246 disproportionately 
comprising the pool of workers paid sub-minimum wages.247  
Employers may declare workers exempt from minimum and overtime 
wage rules by misinterpreting FLSA exemptions248 or misclassifying 
both full-time and part-time workers as independent contractors.249  
Some wage violations can be hidden from even sophisticated workers:  
gender wage discrimination often is proven only by statistical analysis 
comparing workers’ pay data;250 and irregular commissions may be 
payable only if the employer receives the customer payment, not 
when the employee makes the sale.251 
                                                          
 246. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:  THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS 15 (2005) (observing that many immigrants will spend time working for less 
than minimum wage); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of 
Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009) (“American demand for 
inexpensive goods draws international migrants to our factories and fields.”); Noah 
D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage As A Civil Rights Protection:  An Alternative to Antipoverty 
Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4. 
 247. Poverty law scholars have noted the “[d]issonance between the rhetoric of 
supporting work and the reality of denying work’s rewards.”  See Julie A. Nice, Forty 
Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation:  No Acres, No Mule, No Politics, No Rights, 4 NW. 
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 1–2, 4 (2009) (explaining that policy efforts to reduce welfare 
dependence have not successfully addressed the need for livable wages); see also JOEL 
F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
6–7 (2007) (arguing that America has “demonized welfare” while those who “‘play[] 
by the rules’” cannot make it because of stagnant wages in the low-wage labor 
market); Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject:  From Welfare to Poverty to a Living 
Income, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 14, 14, 16–17 (2009) (documenting history of 
America’s simultaneous rhetoric against welfare and lack of support for higher 
wages). 
 248. See Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (explaining that plaintiffs accuse defendants of having misrepresented to 
employees that they were exempt and not entitled to overtime pay); Kamens v. 
Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (providing that 
plaintiffs alleged sufficient affirmative misrepresentations by employer to toll the 
statute of limitations for their claims); Gentry, 165 P.3d at 567 (“The likelihood of 
employee unawareness is even greater when, as alleged in the present case, the 
employer does not simply fail to pay overtime but affirmatively tells its employees that 
they are not eligible for overtime.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286–88, 
295 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment against 
garment workers claiming employers misclassified them as independent contractors 
to claim unlawful wage deductions); Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 
F. Supp. 2d 184, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting delivery workers partial summary 
judgment as to liability on unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims and holding 
that workers were not independent contractors and thus that defendants were “liable 
to [plaintiffs] for violations of the FLSA and New York Labor law”); Lopez v. 
Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 406–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding as a matter of law 
that garment industry “jobber” and garment manufacturer jointly employed 
plaintiffs).  
 250. See, e.g., Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243, 259–64 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (describing plaintiff’s use of statistical evidence to attempt to prove 
defendant’s gender discrimination bias in performance evaluations, pay, and 
promotions, as well as discrimination on account of pregnancy). 
 251. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Burlington Broadcasters Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (App. Div. 
2002) (noting that by contract plaintiff was entitled to commissions on her sales only 
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Collective actions increase awareness of workplace abuses, whether 
through court-supervised employee notification or through plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ own efforts to find and to notify additional workers—
efforts that become more cost-effective when counsel has assurance 
that the case will qualify as a collective action.252  Timely notification 
also helps workers who might not otherwise become aware that their 
wage rights were violated until it is too late:  unlike in Rule 23 class 
actions, where all statutes of limitations are tolled until the court 
grants or denies class certification, the FLSA expressly states that 
limitations periods keep running for each individual until he or she 
opts in as a plaintiff.253  The notice process also points workers to class 
counsel for legal advice and lets them know they are not alone in 
challenging violations.254 
Plaintiffs need not file collective actions, of course; they can sue 
alone, or in a small group, in which case § 216(b) opt-in, notification, 
and certification processes are irrelevant.  But when plaintiffs choose 
to broaden their wage cases into opt-in collective actions, they 
typically need to notify other potential members; such notice is 
hindered by courts’ restrictive “certification” standards. 
4. The impact of certification motions:  litigation cost; delay as limitations    
 periods run and fewer attorneys available 
Even where courts grant certification, the motion process imposes 
substantial costs.  First, because courts demand substantial evidentiary 
showings on certification motions, attorneys must devote significant 
time to the following efforts:  procuring dozens of worker affidavits; 
taking multiple depositions; requesting and reviewing discovery 
documents; and writing the motion itself.255  Second, as with any 
                                                          
“when the customer paid,” not as soon as she made the sale). 
 252. Cuzco v. Orion Builders, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“[F]or the intended benefits of the collective action[,] including allowing plaintiffs 
to pool resources and enabling courts to efficiently resolve multiple similar claims . . . 
, employees must receive ‘accurate and timely notice . . . so that they can make 
informed decisions about whether to participate.’” (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989))). 
 253. See 29 U.S.C. § 256 (2006) (providing that opt-in plaintiff’s claim commences 
for limitations purposes not on lawsuit’s filing but “on the subsequent date . . . 
written consent is filed”). 
 254. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain?  Complaints, Compliance, and 
the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y J. 59, 91 (2005) 
(discussing studies showing workers “are more likely to exercise rights where they 
have an agent that assists them in use of those rights”); see also Pentland v. Dravo 
Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945) (noting collective actions “bring[] something 
of the strength of collective bargaining” to suits risking employer retaliation). 
 255. See, e.g., Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8819(GEL), 2006 WL 
2853971, at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (examining in detail the dueling affidavits 
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ witnesses, as well as multiple transcripts of deposition 
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major motion, the attorneys can spend months briefing and arguing 
the motion, plus additional months waiting for the court’s decision.  
During this time, the two-year statute of limitations period “clock” 
keeps ticking for each potential member until she joins the action, 
resulting in unrecoverable lost wages.256  Third, because the 
certification process increases both litigation costs and the risk of lost 
claims due to delay,257 a few private law firms tend to dominate wage 
collective actions to the exclusion of small firms and non-profit 
lawyers who could also advocate well for workers.258 
In short, the cumbersome process, regardless of whether a court 
grants or denies a motion to certify, substantially impedes workers 
attempting to vindicate their statutory rights.  This situation is 
especially troubling because, as discussed below, the entire endeavor 
of scrutinizing cases for collective action certification is misguided. 
III. COURTS SHOULD ALLOW PLAINTIFFS TO FILE COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
FREELY, WITHOUT CERTIFICATION MOTIONS 
While Part II argued against courts’ prevailing two-step, Rule 23-
style “certification” process for collective actions, this Part details a 
different way courts should handle collective actions.  Part III.A 
begins by surveying existing scholarship critiquing § 216(b):  some 
commentaries argue for broader willingness to certify collective 
actions; others call for tighter application of Rule 23 standards, 
perhaps even a repeal of § 216(b); but no scholarship argues that 
requiring an evidentiary “certification” motion lacks the textual 
authorization or agency-cost rationale that justifies requiring 
certification of Rule 23 class actions. 
Part III.B details this Article’s prescription in three parts, one for 
each player in a collective action lawsuit—the plaintiff, the 
defendant, and the court.  In short, plaintiffs could file and opt in to 
                                                          
testimony, after lengthy briefing of both parties). 
 256. 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
 257. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 4 (“The high cost of notifying absent 
class members when potential recovery is very small deters entrepreneurial attorneys 
from bringing meritorious suits.  Thus, the rule harms, rather than protects, absent 
class members.”). 
 258. For information regarding impact worker rights litigation by non-profits, see, 
for example, Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 404–05 (7th Cir. 
2007) (involving a FLSA action for migrant farmworkers’ unpaid wages, brought by 
the National Employment Law Project (NELP)); Moon v. Kwon, 248 F. Supp. 2d 201, 
203 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving an action for hotel workers’ unpaid wages, brought by 
the Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund (AALDEF)); Ansoumana v. 
Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (naming NELP as one 
of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in an action for supermarket delivery workers’ unpaid 
wages). 
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collective actions freely without any certification motion, while 
defendants would bear the burden of challenging collective actions 
in Rule 21 misjoinder or Rule 12 dismissal motions.  Courts, although 
lacking Rule 23 gatekeeping powers, would still wield three basic 
powers:  deciding defense motions; supervising requested notice to 
potential opt-ins; and policing whatever modest asymmetric 
information and principal-agent problems may arise in multiple-
plaintiff representation, by enforcing ethics rules on avoiding 
conflicting interests and ensuring clients remain informed decision 
makers.  Finally, Part III.C notes that this prescription would not only 
bring judicial practice into compliance with federal statutes and 
rules, but also decrease litigation costs, speed up litigation, and 
facilitate vindication of important rights in collective actions. 
A. Existing Calls for Reform:  Stricter Scrutiny Versus Broader 
Certification—But No Questioning of the Premise 
The academic commentary on § 216(b) is sparse but features 
varied calls for reform.  Of those commentators who have written on 
the issue, many dislike § 216(b) entirely, preferring the tougher Rule 
23 criteria.  One “urges Congress to abolish collective actions by 
repealing § 216(b),” leaving wage actions governed by Rule 23 
because “§ 216(b) was drafted during the infancy of group litigation 
and is an antiquated vestige.”259  Another argues that the prevailing 
“two-stage, ad hoc approach” to certification “fails to provide courts 
with proper guidance in determining whether plaintiffs [are] 
similarly situated,” and that courts should apply Rule 23 standards to 
§ 216(b) collective actions.260 
Others, though noting that § 216(b) originated as a mere joinder 
device,261 believe courts should undertake a more “rigorous analysis”262 
that more routinely rejects collective actions—even where workers 
are “similarly situated.”263  They further argue that, unless the 
plaintiffs’ common issues are substantial enough to “expressly permit 
common answers” for each, “the court must . . . determine if it is fair 
and efficient to try the case in one proceeding, notwithstanding that 
those initially joining the action may be ‘similarly situated.’”264  This 
view parallels the Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart Stores that the 
                                                          
 259. Lopez, supra note 20, at 278–79. 
 260. Fraser, supra note 20, at 122. 
 261. King & Ozumba, supra note 19, at 281. 
 262. Id. at 281, 300–01. 
 263. Id. at 273. 
 264. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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class action commonality requirement is stricter than the joinder 
requirement of one common issue.265 
Others call for broader permission for § 216(b) collective actions 
but still assume a judicial power to condition such cases on an 
evidentiary motion for certification.  One commentator asserts that 
the “opt-in feature raises a presumption of active, informed” class 
members, an argument with three implications:  (1) it “sav[es] courts 
from having to conduct detailed inquiries into whether each . . . 
member’s interests are adequately represented,” (2) it “better 
justif[ies] a conditional certification,” and (3) it justifies “plac[ing] 
the burden upon any party . . . challeng[ing] class certification on 
grounds of insufficient plaintiff protections.”266  Yet that commentator 
still accepts courts’ “managerial responsibility” to scrutinize “evidence 
that opt-in members’ interests are not being adequately represented 
or protected.”267 
Two others believe courts should more liberally certify collective 
actions, even where workers’ claims vary, by using sampling 
techniques.268  For instance, courts could “select a test group of 
plaintiffs . . . and opt-ins” for limited discovery and early dispositive 
motions.269  As another option, courts could preside over “a 
representative trial as in a class action,” with a defense victory ending 
the case or a plaintiff’s victory allowing a plaintiffs’ motion for partial 
summary judgment “on the basis of non-mutual offensive issue 
preclusion . . . [to] extend[] the trial rulings” to other plaintiffs.270 
Surprisingly, no commentary appears to argue that a requirement 
of proving “certification” lacks the textual authorization or agency-
cost rationale that exists for Rule 23 class actions.  The difficult 
question is what would replace the current scheme; following is what 
this Article offers as a preferable alternative. 
B. The Prescription:  Allow Plaintiffs to File Together, Leaving the Burden 
on Defendants to Challenge Similarity, Without Judicial “Gatekeeping” Power 
This Article prescribes that courts apply a streamlined method 
when assessing the propriety of collective actions, but that they 
should generally refrain from making such an assessment at all, 
except under certain circumstances.  This subpart elaborates upon 
                                                          
 265. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 266. Gates, supra note 20, at 1554–55 (emphasis omitted). 
 267. Id. at 1555. 
 268. Borgen & Ho, supra note 19, at 155–56. 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. at 156. 
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this streamlined method by considering in turn the proper roles of 
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts. 
1. Plaintiff’s role:  to file collective actions at will, in the same manner as 
 multiple-plaintiff captions under joinder rules 
Plaintiffs should have a recognized right to bring a collective action 
upon pleading that other workers are similarly situated—and those 
other workers should have a recognized right to file an opt-in consent 
without having to file any motion seeking judicial approval.  Such a 
rule would be a vast departure from existing practice, but one district 
court so held in 1946 when it found that § 216(b) grants:   
[a] right to intervene . . . [that] appears to be unconditional 
because the statute expressly indicates that one or more employees 
similarly situated can jointly originate such an action . . . regardless 
of the ordinary requirements of law as to proper joinder . . . .  [I]t 
would be an excessively strict construction which would say that 
parties who have an absolute right to join as plaintiffs have less 
than an absolute right . . . to become plaintiffs after its 
commencement.271 
No courts have cited this decision in decades, but its approach is 
correct:  plaintiffs pressing claims as “similarly situated” could opt in 
freely, absent the sort of motion, detailed below, challenging the 
propriety of their joinder. 
2. Defendant’s role:  to file misjoinder or dismissal motions, with the burden
 of disproving sufficient commonality for joinder 
A defense motion is the proper method of redress when plaintiffs 
try to aggregate § 216(b)-covered claims that vary too widely for the 
workers to be considered “similarly situated.”  Some § 216(b) 
claimants may well be too varied for a collective action,272 but that 
does not mean the plaintiffs must be the ones filing motions or be 
held to heightened evidentiary proof of commonality.  Because Rule 
20 is far more relevant to § 216(b) cases than Rule 23, courts should 
handle challenges to § 216(b) collective action status like they handle 
challenges to Rule 20 joinder of multiple plaintiffs’ claims.  
Specifically, the two rules allowing challenges to Rule 20 joinder 
should apply equally to issues of collective action status under § 
216(b). 
First, Rule 21 “misjoinder”:  in circumstances such as those where 
                                                          
 271. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, 5 F.R.D. 174, 176 (N.D. Ala. 
1946). 
 272. See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. 
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discovery undercuts the allegations that initially justified joinder, 
“[o]n motion . . . the court may at any time, on just terms, add or 
drop a party.”273  Such an order would then wholly undo the Rule 20 
joinder by dividing the plaintiffs’ claims into independent cases. 
Second, Rule 42(b) “severance”:  a court may keep the parties 
joined but order separate trials for each plaintiff, or for various 
groups of plaintiffs, if it deems doing so necessary “[f]or 
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize [the 
proceedings].”274  One 1946 decision, though not citing Rule 42, 
noted that plaintiffs may be “similarly situated” enough to satisfy § 
216(b) but still need separate trials:   
while the claims . . . are similar in certain respects and enough . . . 
[to be] similarly situated . . . still . . . it will be necessary for the 
cases to be tried separately to determine whether . . . [each] 
particular person [is] within the [FLSA] provisions . . . .275 
That decision has drawn no citations for decades, but it is exactly 
the result many modern courts denying “certification” should reach:  
plaintiffs sharing FLSA claims against the same employer are amply 
“similarly situated” even if their claims vary enough for each plaintiff, 
or subgroups of plaintiffs, to justify separate trials under Rule 42. 
Modern courts typically do not wait for defendants to challenge 
aggregation.  As detailed above, though, it was how courts 
entertained challenges to original Rule 23(a)(3) spurious class 
actions, which are the closest analogues to § 216(b) cases.  For 
example, in Lipsett v. United States, the court recognized that:   
the striking of the allegations of a spurious class action ought 
generally to be improper unless the court knows no intervention is 
possible. . . .  Since the spurious class action is a mere device for 
permissive joinder, the proper procedure is to leave the allegation 
standing to facilitate . . . intervention.  “If it shall later appear that 
the plaintiffs are not able within a reasonable time to obtain others 
to intervene in the class action it may properly be dismissed as a 
class action.”276 
                                                          
 273. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 274. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b); Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424, 
442 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 662 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed through discovery with joined claims despite 
potential prejudice, with court “retain[ing] flexibility to sever portions of [claims] or 
to take other remedial actions, if necessary,” later in the case).  See generally WRIGHT, 
MILLER & KANE, supra note 116, § 1660 (“The general philosophy of the joinder 
provisions . . . is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage but to give 
the district court discretion to shape the trial . . . .”). 
 275. Wright v. U.S. Rubber Co., 69 F. Supp. 621, 623 (S.D. Iowa 1946). 
 276. Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944) 
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3. Court’s role:  to decide parties’ motions and police ethics violations 
By requiring each member to opt in, § 216(b) collective actions 
avoid the substantial agency problems of Rule 23 class actions.  An 
opt-in action is little different from a standard case with five or thirty 
plaintiffs in the caption:  whether each is well-informed, or actively 
involved, depends on issues such as education level, language 
barriers, and attorney honesty.  So, the threat of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
neglecting opt-ins is not different in kind from ethical concerns 
arising in any case, individual or aggregate.  Accordingly, courts in 
collective actions not only lack the authority Rule 23 grants over the 
decisions of plaintiffs and counsel, but also the agency rationale that 
would make such powers a normatively sound idea. 
The fact that collective actions do not raise substantial agency 
concerns, however, does not mean courts have no role.  Courts have 
two critical roles to fulfill in collective actions, each detailed below:  
(a) deciding parties’ motions on the propriety of collective actions 
and of court-ordered notice; and (b) policing violations of ethics 
rules about jointly representing multiple plaintiffs. 
 a. Deciding parties’ motions on the propriety of collective actions and 
 court-ordered notice  
Despite lacking the power to “certify” a collective action and to 
require plaintiffs to file motions seeking such certification, courts 
remain empowered to decide the propriety of a § 216(b) collective 
action.  As Part III.B.2 above details, courts would decide whether 
workers are “similarly situated” on defendants’ motions for Rule 12 
dismissal or Rule 21 misjoinder—but the standard would be simple 
joinder, not the more searching “commonality” inquiry. 
Further, courts would decide whether court-ordered notice is 
proper—but the inquiry would extend only to the propriety and 
contents of the notice, not to the whether the entire collective action 
should proceed.  Should the court wish to address the “similarly 
situated” issue contemporaneously with its “notice” decision, the 
joinder rules remain the proper vehicle:  Rule 21 allows a court “on 
its own,” to consider whether there is “misjoinder;” the court simply 
must apply the joinder standard, not the current heightened 
commonality standard. 
                                                          
(emphasis added)). 
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b. Policing violations of ethics rules when jointly representing multiple  
 plaintiffs 
Although fewer agency problems exist in collective actions, 
collective actions raise enough ethical issues to suggest a watchdog 
role for courts.277  First, especially in large cases, many opt-in plaintiffs 
participate little if at all:  they may lack voice in major decisions like 
class-wide settlements or attorneys may not fully apprise them of case 
events.  Second, plaintiffs may have conflicting interests, such as if a 
group of assistant managers seeks overtime pay, while a second group 
worked off-the-clock because their timesheets were altered by the first 
group.  Third, clients may be unaware when their attorneys lack the 
experience or resources for major § 216(b) collective actions.  Legal 
ethics rules278 address these three problems:   
• attorneys must allow each client to exercise decision-making 
authority over major decisions like filing suit, responding to 
a settlement offer, or ending the case on other terms,279 
each of which requires keeping clients informed;280 
• where attorneys represent multiple clients, they must 
procure informed consent if the clients’ interests may 
                                                          
 277. See supra Part II.A.4.b. 
 278. While no single binding set of attorney ethics rules exists, the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) are “the primary model for the ethics 
rules governing . . . the overwhelming majority of American lawyers.”  Lucian T. 
Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership:  State Adoption of the Revised 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637, 637 (2005).  The 
Model Rules were adopted by over 40 states and are “influential . . . in states that had 
chosen not to adopt them.”  Id. at 640.  Discussion herein will thus cite the Model 
Rules and state cases based on those rules. 
 279. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by 
a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . consult with 
the client as to the means by which they are pursued.  A lawyer may take such action 
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation 
[and] shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); see id. R. 1.2 cmt. 
1 (“Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the 
purposes to be served by legal representation . . . .  The decisions specified in 
paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the 
client.”). 
 280. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4) (“A lawyer shall . . . (2) 
reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives 
are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter; [and] (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information . . . 
.”); see id. R. 1.4 cmt. 1 (providing that “[r]easonable communication between lawyer 
and client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation”); 
In re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D. Conn. 2001) (“Implicit in 
Rule 1.2(a)’s requirement that a lawyer ‘shall abide by a client’s decision . . . ’ [is] a 
requirement to communicate all settlement offers to the client.”); see also Carranza v. 
Fraas, 763 F. Supp. 2d 113, 125–26 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying D.C. Rule and observing 
that “[w]ithholding . . . information [regarding settlement offers] precludes a 
client’s ability to participate . . . in decisions that go to the core of the attorney-client 
relationship”).  
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conflict281 and must withdraw if the interests conflict too 
deeply;282 and attorneys should litigate cases competently, 
and in complex or specialized fields, with adequate 
experience.283 
Because collective action motions do not presumptively pose 
agency problems like Rule 23 class actions, courts do not need to 
impose a collective action certification motion as a prophylactic 
measure.  Rather, courts could police ethics problems on motions 
filed by defendants or by sua sponte court orders. 
As a limited prophylactic measure, however, courts should require 
plaintiffs’ counsel to provide opt-in plaintiffs with notice and an 
opportunity to participate in major case events, based on the ethics 
rules requiring counsel to keep the client reasonably informed and 
reasonably consult with the client on significant tactics.284  The 
“reasonably” qualifier provides attorneys and courts with some 
discretion about what measures are practical; the determination will 
depend on factors including the number of plaintiffs and the 
substantiality of the particular decision in question.285 
If courts apply the ethics rules requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to 
                                                          
 281. Unless the client gives informed consent, in addition to other requirements,  
a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest . . . [which] exists if:  (1) the representation of 
one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client . . . . 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b). 
 282. See, e.g., FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(affirming district court ruling that attorney “will likely be compelled to furnish 
testimony that may be substantially adverse to his client” because he “is a necessary 
witness”). 
 283. “A lawyer shall provide competent representation[, which] requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary . . . .”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1. 
[F]actors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the 
matter . . . [,] the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, 
the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it 
is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of 
established competence in the field in question.  In many instances, the 
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.  Expertise in a 
particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. 
Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 1; see also Fed. Grievance Comm. v. Spat, No. 3:99 GP 23 (JBA), 2006 
WL 1050039, at *1 & n.3 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2006) (analyzing, under Connecticut 
rule identical to Model Rule 1.1, attorney’s failure to review a file prior to 
appearing); In re Dean, 401 B.R. 917, 925 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (analyzing 
attorney’s behavior under Idaho rule identical to Model Rule 1.1). 
 284. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2)–(4). 
 285. For example, with 100,000 plaintiffs, requiring attorneys to notify plaintiffs of 
every motion would be impractical unless the process were as easy as sending a single 
email.  But with twenty plaintiffs, ethical representation would entail the same level 
of attorney-client communication as in a single-plaintiff case. 
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consult with clients and keep them reasonably informed, that would 
suffice to assure adequate representation—as much as it can be 
assured in any case.  A more thorough Rule 23(a)(4) inquiry into 
plaintiffs’ counsel is not justified by the agency and asymmetric 
information problems that justify it for Rule 23 class actions.  Without 
such express authority as Rule 23(a)(4) provides for class actions, 
courts cannot claim a power over choice of counsel because of the 
principle that “a party’s right to representation by the attorney of its 
choice . . . is a valued right and any restrictions must be carefully 
scrutinized.”286 
C. Ramifications of the Prescription:  Fewer Costly Motions and Improper 
Denials; Minimal Risk of Excessive Collective Actions 
Is there much difference between maintaining the current § 
216(b) certification practice and, instead, presumptively allowing 
collective actions while permitting defendants the option to 
challenge collective status?  The difference is in the details, but it is 
quite substantial. 
First, there is a significant difference between a motion about one 
common issue—the joinder standard that this Article argues should 
apply—and the seven-part Rule 23 certification motion.  After Wal-
Mart Stores, the once-modest Rule 23(a) commonality requirement is 
now strictly construed to demand that “claims must depend upon a 
common contention,” defined as not just any common issue, but an 
issue so fundamental that “determination of its truth or falsity will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims 
in one stroke.”287  Virtually all collective actions that courts reject 
because of differing job duties or supervisors288 would amply meet the 
proper joinder standard, so long as plaintiffs share a single common 
issue of law or fact.  Any claims that the same employer violated the 
same statutory provision (e.g., the overtime pay requirement) would 
meet the joinder requirement, absent extenuating circumstances like 
identical statutory claims relying on entirely different factual 
evidence and legal doctrines.289 
Second, if the applicable standard is the simple joinder 
requirement of one common issue, some defendants would choose 
not to make a motion against collective action status.  Where a 
                                                          
 286. S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 
1987). 
 287. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 288. See supra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. 
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motion would be futile, some lawyers might be ignorant or unethical 
enough to file one anyway, but experience with dispositive motions 
shows defendants may decline to make even high-stakes motions 
when doing so would be futile.  Despite the increased prevalence and 
success of dispositive motions in recent decades, as the Supreme 
Court broadened the grounds for both Rule 12 dismissal290 and Rule 
56 summary judgment,291 defendants sometimes decline to make Rule 
12 or 56 motions.292  Not all, but many, wage cases are ideal for 
aggregate treatment because of the obvious, substantial similarity of 
the claims;293 under this Article’s proposal, defense motions 
challenging collective action status in such cases would be 
unsuccessful. 
Third, even if there is a defense motion, it likely would be one 
motion rather than two as under existing practice—thus halving 
motion costs and lessening motion-imposed delay.294  To be sure, 
some defendants could try to file one motion early (e.g., on the 
complaint) and one later (e.g., on evidence adduced in discovery)—
but not always, and even so, such motions would likely merge with 
dismissal or summary judgment motions the defendant was already 
filing. 
Fourth, federal courts try to weed out hopeless motions in advance, 
                                                          
 290. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 829–30 (2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s radical 
changes to the law on pleading starting in 2007, when the Court “added a 
requirement for claimants that goes above and beyond having to give notice” and a 
“requirement that at the pleading stage the plaintiff has the burden of establishing . . 
. the complaint’s plausibility as to liability on the merits” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)). 
 291. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 73 (1990) (observing that “docket pressures on the federal 
judiciary have prompted dramatic revisions in federal procedure,” and discussing a 
1986 “trilogy of cases . . . [that] significantly expanded the applicability of summary 
judgment under Rule 56”). 
 292. There of course are no citations to judicial decisions on summary judgment 
motions that parties never file, but the docket reports in various cases show an 
absence of a summary judgment motion.  See, e.g., Hens v. ClientLogic Operating 
Corp., No. 05-0381 (W.D.N.Y.) (docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final 
approval of settlement Dec. 21, 2010); Clark v. Ecolab, Inc., No. 07-8623 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final approval of settlement May 19, 
2010); Mohney v. Shelly’s Prime Steak, Stone Crab & Oyster Bar, No. 06-4270 
(S.D.N.Y.) (docket reflecting no dispositive motions, with final approval of 
settlement Dec. 8, 2009). 
 293. See, e.g., Shain v. Armour & Co., 40 F. Supp. 488, 490 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (“The 
evident purpose of the [FLSA] is to provide one law suit in which the claims of 
different employees, different in amount but all arising out of the same character of 
employment, can be presented and adjudicated, regardless of the fact that they are 
separate and independent of each other.”). 
 294. As detailed earlier, avoiding delay is particularly important for workers whose 
claims diminish under the statute of limitations until they opt in, especially low-wage 
workers with great need for all wages they earn.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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such as by requiring short pre-motion letters—typically no longer 
than three pages—before the filing of certain types of motions.295  
Under this Article’s proposal, defense decertification motions would 
likely require summarized pre-motion letters to the court.  Many 
courts’ rules requiring pre-motion letters for Rule 12 dismissal and 
Rule 56 summary judgment motions296 already would cover 
decertification motions filed under those rules. 
Finally, as a policy matter, this is an area where false negatives are 
more worrisome than false positives.  False negatives—improper 
rejections of collective actions—are a major problem because, as 
detailed above, disallowing a collective action is a death knell for 
workers seeking to vindicate important statutory rights.297  In contrast, 
false positives—allowing collective actions to proceed when doing so 
is overly costly or unfair to defendants—is less of a concern.  Most 
collective actions are wage claims, which, even if borderline as to 
commonality, are simple enough to litigate together.  For example, in 
a case where employees in four different job categories each 
experienced different wage violations, the plaintiffs would just need 
to show evidence of the four fact patterns, not litigate a full individual 
trial for each member. 
Age or equal pay claims more often may lack sufficient 
commonality than wage claims; but, as some of the leading ADEA 
collective actions illustrate, many age collective actions do focus on a 
single common retirement or reduction-in-force decision applicable 
to all plaintiffs.298  Ultimately, where claims vary too much for 
collective adjudication—whether FLSA, ADEA, or EPA claims—
defendants should prevail on their misjoinder or dismissal motions.  
This Article’s proposal still lets courts reject collective actions for too-
                                                          
 295. E.g., E.D.N.Y. LOC. CIV. R. 37.3 (requiring that before any discovery motion, 
party must file a “letter not exceeding three pages in length outlining the nature of 
the dispute and attaching relevant materials,” which may yield a “[d]ecision of the 
[c]ourt” before any formal motion). 
 296. See, e.g., Individual Motion Practice and Rules of Judge Joseph F. Bianco, E.D.N.Y., 
R. III(A), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/rules/JFB-MLR.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2011) (requiring, before filing dismissal or summary judgment 
motion, “the moving party shall submit a letter not to exceed three pages in length 
setting forth the basis for the anticipated motion,” with opponent entitled to file 
letter as well). 
 297. See supra Part II.B. 
 298. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 168 (1989) (deciding 
ADEA discrimination claim under § 216(b) involving a single “reduction in work 
force [that] discharged or demoted some 1,200 workers”); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. 
Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 2001) (considering ADEA claim under 
§ 216(b) in which plaintiffs alleged that new management determined older workers 
were “‘blocking’ the advancement of younger, newly recruited employees,” and 
requested human resources to “prepare severance worksheets” and terminate older 
employees (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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varied claims—so long as courts do so on properly filed defense 
motions, rather than by imposing on plaintiffs the current improper 
requirements of evidentiary motions and heightened commonality 
standards. 
IV. WHY COURTS MAKE THESE ERRORS:  INNOCENT AND LESS 
INNOCENT EXPLANATIONS 
When courts err, why do they err?  Two possible explanations exist 
for courts’ misinterpretations of § 216(b), one relatively innocent and 
the other less so.  While some may credit one over the other, each 
likely carries some truth. 
A. Path Dependence:  In a Complex, Once-Obscure Field, Relying on 
Precedent That Proves Misguided 
As detailed above, there is a curious history to the now-prevailing 
idea that § 216(b) collective actions require a certification motion by 
plaintiffs and a two-stage judicial inquiry.  In 1995, the Fifth Circuit in 
Mooney detailed the two-stage certification process,299 but that process 
was based on weak precedent and the court did not actually endorse 
it.  Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions then purported to follow 
Mooney in endorsing that process,300 and district courts nationwide cite 
those three circuit decisions in applying that process.301 
The stare decisis doctrine of adhering to precedent “provid[es] 
both continuity and predictability,”302 but comes with a downside on 
vivid display in the § 216(b) case law.  Basing decisions on precedent, 
rather than de novo analysis, can lock in past error by making law 
“path-dependent”303:  each “precedent influences subsequent legal 
decisions [that] . . . ‘when decided . . . become, in turn, a part of the 
legal framework.’”304  With decisions basing on precedent, “the 
                                                          
 299. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 300. See supra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text. 
 302. William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law:  Transaction Cost 
Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1063 (1996). 
 303. For analysis on how stare decisis yields path-dependence and lock-in, see, for 
example, Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry:  A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 
86 VA. L. REV. 727, 742 (2000) (observing that “even small historical events, 
particularly those that occur early in the formation of an industry, can have 
unexpectedly long-lasting effects . . . [and] produce a path far different from the one 
taken in the[ir] absence”); Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status 
Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
25, 37 (2006) (noting that “[w]here stare decisis is the rule, path dependence is the 
inevitable result”). 
 304. Aceves, supra note 302, at 1062–63 (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 97 (1990)); see 
also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:  Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 
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evolution of . . . doctrine will depend, to a large extent, upon the 
order in which cases are presented or, in the language of social 
choice, will be ‘path dependent.’”305 
Thus when early case law gets something wrong, the status of that 
erroneous decision as precedent can perpetuate the holding in 
future case law.  A party certainly can argue against, or a judge can 
reject, a bad precedent, but the doctrine of stare decisis places a 
thumb on the scale in favor of a precedent-supported argument over 
a new argument.  In sum, the tendency of path dependence to lock 
in the sub-optimal is an information market failure.  What prevails is 
not the best idea among a marketplace of freely competing ideas, but 
the idea enjoying a privileged status because of its early adoption. 
Further, collective action procedure since the mid-1990s is a prime 
area in which judges would be strongly disposed to place a thumb on 
the scale in favor of following precedent.  Even if courts have over-
interpreted Hoffmann-La Roche “notice” as supporting complex 
certification processes, that case certainly changed matters, forcing 
courts to innovate.  That need to innovate arose in a field where 
courts had little experience because § 216(b) was a unique process, 
varying the joinder and class action rules judges applied far more 
frequently.  A rarely-faced issue imposes high information costs, 
making reliance on path-dependent shortcuts, like following 
precedent, entirely rational.306  However, this can also lead to missteps 
like relying on weak precedents such as Mooney. 
Furthering judges’ path-dependent reliance upon precedent is that 
judicial decision-making is short on big-picture theory.  Some judges 
blast academics for being disengaged, focusing on big-picture theory, 
and neglecting the nuts and bolts of how law really works.307  Merits of 
this criticism aside, judges certainly can err the other way, not 
spending time contemplating the big picture because of docket 
                                                          
CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1412 (1995) (describing path dependence as a “negative, and 
unintended, consequence” of stare decisis). 
 305. Stearns, supra note 304, at 1309. 
 306. See Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag:  An Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal Change, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (noting that path-dependence can arise when 
“seemingly rational actors . . . adopt arguably suboptimal behaviors which they 
continue to follow because moving to a better system would involve unacceptable 
expense in terms of transition costs, information costs, and/or risk”); Scharff & 
Parisi, supra note 303, at 28 (“[W]hen an individual is faced with a new situation 
(such as the existence of a new legal right) . . . [t]he rational desire to avoid these 
adjustment costs can result in an exaggerated preference for the status quo.”); 
 307. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (describing issues that have arisen 
in legal education and practice that “call[] into question our status as an honorable 
profession”). 
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pressures and case-specific focus.308  Judges’ understandable aversion 
to big-picture theory may explain why they follow readily available, 
on-point precedent like Mooney, rather than critically analyzing how 
varied aggregate litigation types relate and differ—such as how one 
type (collective actions) presents less principal-agent difficulty than 
another (class actions). 
Path dependence may not, however, completely explain how early 
§ 216(b) precedents established a locked-in bad practice.  Stare 
decisis is just a thumb on the scale in favor of the argument 
precedent supports, but precedents erode when judges are 
sufficiently convinced.  That is why “[s]tare decisis is a tendency 
rather than a rule,” for “if it were a rule, one would get strict path 
dependence, which no one wants.”309  So the question is why 
erroneous § 216(b) precedents are the sort that remain followed; it 
could be just unfortunate coincidence, or the following additional 
explanation may provide the answer. 
B. Hostility to Litigation As a Tool of Dispute Resolution and Social Reform 
As Andrew Siegel argues in constitutional law, the organizing 
theme of the modern Supreme Court is not federalism, originalism, 
textualism, or judicial restraint, but hostility to litigation as a tool of 
dispute resolution and social reform.310  Justices who are generally 
pro-states’ rights aggressively rein in state litigation by broadly 
preempting state law with federal law;311 while originalist and 
textualist Justices reject those methods when ahistorical, atextual 
                                                          
 308. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of 
Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 816 (2009) 
(noting that judges “may be interested in ‘truth’ or ‘edification’ . . . not as an end 
itself . . . but only to the extent that these serve the end of reaching a decision, a 
holding, an order and decree” because their focus must be on “the resolution of 
disputes, the rendition of decisions, . . . and the clearing of dockets”). 
 Or as Judge Constance Baker Motley told one of us (Moss) when, as a law clerk, 
he handed her an unreasonably long draft judicial opinion (roughly 15,000 words) 
that took far too long to write:  “We decide cases here; we don’t write law review 
articles.” 
 309. Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of 
Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 288 (1992). 
 310. See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1097 (2006). 
 311. “One might expect a Court committed to protecting state autonomy and 
limiting federal regulatory authority to be sympathetic to arguments that state laws 
should not easily be overridden by federal laws”—but the modern Court “has 
consistently rejected” that approach and “overwhelmingly sided with those 
advocating the invalidation of state regulation.”  Id. at 1166.  In opinions joined by 
“Justices who have in other contexts been the champions of state autonomy,” the 
modern Court is “finding preemption in over two-thirds of the cases.”  Id. at 1166–67. 
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Eleventh Amendment interpretations eliminate a range of 
employment lawsuits.312 
One of us has similarly argued that hostility to litigation explains 
certain statutory and rule interpretation, not just constitutional 
interpretation.313  In discretionary interpretations of matters not 
detailed in statutory text, such as how to apply vicarious liability or 
limitations periods, the Court makes pro-defense rulings premised on 
inconsistent policy arguments, requiring plaintiffs to delay suit in 
some cases (on penalty of dismissal for failing to use internal dispute 
resolution314), but requiring immediate lawsuits in others (on penalty 
of dismissal under strictly construed limitations periods315).  Further 
evidencing hostility to litigation are decisions disallowing consumer316 
or employee317 suits against companies that insert mandatory 
arbitration clauses in preprinted materials, and the Wal-Mart Stores 
decision that, “[b]y critically examining and rejecting the employees’ 
statistical, anecdotal, and social science evidence, . . . raised the bar 
for [commonality] evidence.”318 
Federal district and appellate courts are even more hostile to 
litigation; the Supreme Court issued several unanimous rulings for 
employment plaintiffs in the 2000s319 not because it is pro-plaintiff, 
                                                          
 312. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (holding that though 
Eleventh Amendment text bars only citizens’ suits against other states, that 
amendment also bars citizens from suing their own states because the Court has 
“‘understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for 
the presupposition . . . which it confirms’” (citation omitted)). 
 313. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation:  A Tale of Two 
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 984 (2007). 
 314. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 315. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623–24 (2007), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C); Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 104–05 (2002); see also Moss, supra note 313, at 1008–
12 (arguing that a “discovery rule is necessary . . . because good employees may be 
slow to conclude that they have suffered discrimination”). 
 316. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749, 1753 (2011) 
(rejecting applicability of state-law unconscionability defense to arbitration 
provision). 
 317. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461, 1474 (2009) (holding 
that arbitration could bar federal lawsuit on statutory rights). 
 318. Cathleen S. Yonahara, Landmark Supreme Court Ruling Blocks Class-Action 
Discrimination Suit, 21 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 4 (2011). 
 319. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–64 (2006) 
(reversing circuits deeming only certain retaliatory acts “adverse” enough to be 
actionable); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) 
(reversing decision on what remarks are probative of discrimination and other 
matters); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92, 101 (2003) (holding that 
“direct” evidence is not required for certain analyses of whether discrimination was a 
“motivating factor”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153–
54 (2000) (reversing circuits’ pretext-plus rule that disproving employer’s 
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but to reverse adventurously pro-defense circuits.  For example, in 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,320 the Court reversed as “inconsistent with 
the text” cases imposing a “heightened showing” of “direct” rather 
than circumstantial evidence for certain claims.321  Furthermore, in 
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,322 the Court had to inform the Eleventh 
Circuit that even if the term “boy” could be nondiscriminatory, “it [is] 
not . . . always benign” given “context, . . . local custom, and historical 
usage”323:  a white Alabama poultry plant supervisor called “boy” the 
same African-Americans he rejected for jobs.324 
In sum, courts’ hostility to litigation, shown by their pattern of 
pretrial dismissals, may be the most powerful explanation for the 
problem this Article diagnoses:  judges’ improper self-empowerment 
to dismiss collective actions by requiring a high-threshold evidentiary 
motion unauthorized by statute, rule, historical practice, or agency 
theory. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to explain from various perspectives 
how and why courts’ handling of § 216(b) collective actions has been 
fundamentally incorrect.  As a matter of textual interpretation, courts 
are unauthorized to impose in § 216(b) cases the sort of certification 
motion requirement and strict commonality inquiry that only Rule 23 
requires.  As a matter of economic theory, § 216(b) cases do not 
feature the asymmetric information and principal-agent problems 
that justify the Rule 23 provisions empowering judges to act as 
gatekeepers of the filing, representation, and counsel decisions 
parties ordinarily make themselves.  As a policy matter, the 
certification motion and strict commonality requirements prevent 
vindication of important statutory rights that are regularly violated, 
but rarely litigated individually.  And as a matter of pragmatism, the 
labyrinthine two-stage procedure is no necessary evil, given this 
Article’s offer of a feasible alternative.  From all these perspectives, 
the case law is equally wrong, regardless of whether it arose from 
innocent path-dependent lock-in of erroneous precedent or whether 
it arose from judicial hostility to individual rights litigation.  Either 
way, § 216(b) collective actions have risen from a once-obscure field 
                                                          
explanation cannot prove discrimination). 
 320. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 321. Id. at 98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)). 
 322. 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (per curiam). 
 323. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
 324. Id. 
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to a major area of high-impact litigation, making courts’ mishandling 
of them a troubling error warranting correction. 
